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Abstract 
 
This dissertation is a desktop documentary review of the theory and practice of the 
New Public Management (NPM) in the public service context of a democratic 
South Africa. It undertakes an extensive review of the literature on NPM and 
explores in some detail the NPM’s origins, definitions, key characteristics, critiques 
and lessons learned. The study then considers the role of this NPM framework in 
South Africa’s public sector reform programme post 1994, and assess the extent to 
which it has been influenced by NPM principles. The successes and failures of 
NPM-inspired processes in South Africa are considered.  
 
The study argues that while the significance of NPM in the reform and 
transformation of the South African public service has, since the start of the new 
millennium, shown signs of decline in favour of a strong central developmental 
state, it did find its way into the South African reform agenda and its continuities are 
still evident. This is discussed with reference to mutually related NPM ideas such as 
the reduction of the size of the public service or rightsizing and downsizing, the 
devolution of managerial responsibility or the concept of the autonomous manager, 
the redefinition of the citizen as a ‘customer’ or emphasis on customer service, and 
alternative service delivery methods such as Public-Private Partnerships. The study 
concludes that these elements of NPM were evident but those that could have been 










Dissertation with corrections_04_09_2009 4 




















































Dissertation with corrections_04_09_2009 5 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Doctrinal components of new public management ................................. 21 
Table 2: Critiques of New Public Management..................................................... 36 
Table 3: Employment Trends: March 1995 - March 1998 ..................................... 54 






List of Acronyms 
 
NPM                       New Public Management  
PSC                         Public Service Commission 
PRC                         Presidential Review Commission 
ANC                        African National Congress 
PPPs                        Public Private Partnerships 
ASD                        Alternative Service Delivery 
SOE's                      State-Owned Enterprises 
COSATU                 Congress of South African Trade Unions 
WPTPSD                 White Paper on the Transformation of  Public Service Delivery 
WPTPS                    White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service 
IMF                         International Monetary Fund 
UNDESA                 United Nations Department for Economic and Soccial Affairs 
 































1.1. Introduction  
 
Between 1994 and 2001 the democratic government of South Africa placed much 
emphasis on policy formulation to reform and reconfigure the public service  (van 
Dyk-Robertson, 2008) for better delivery of public services and improvement of 
professional ethics. The dominant public administration theory during this period 
was the New Public Management (NPM), which is essentially a series of policies 
aimed at improving the efficiency with which public services are provided.  
 
The NPM is usually associated with the international public sector modernization 
movement that became largely prominent in some industrialized countries, 
particularly the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, during the late 1970’s 
and the early 1980’s. The movement is not so much a coherent theory rather than 
‘a discrete set of ideas’, which Cameron (2005:7) divides into two broad categories, 
namely ‘the use of private management principles, such as greater autonomy for 
managers, performance management and new financial techniques’ on the one 
hand, and a ‘greater use of market mechanisms, such as public-private partnerships 
and privatisation in service provision’ on the other. NPM is thus ‘generally inspired 
by the values and concepts of the private sector’  (Cameron, 2005:7). 
 
NPM ideas first found their way to Africa through the structural adjustment 
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attempted to make the state market-friendly, lean, managerial, decentralised and 
customer oriented  (Mhone, 2003). This included the privatization of state-owned 
enterprises, elimination of price controls and subsidies, deregulation of the money 
market and devaluation of  ‘over-valued’ currencies  (Balogun, 2003). The 
downsizing of the civil service - shutting down of certain agencies, retrenchment of 
redundant personnel and cutting of government expenditure – was also an 
important part of the process  (Balogun, 2003). In this case NPM represented a 
transfer of so-called modern management knowledge and practices employed in 
the rich donor countries. Underpinning this transfer is the idea that these practices 
represent an advanced form of management, and that developing countries will 
benefit from an infusion of the management knowledge behind these practices  
(Wahlberg, 2003).  
 
Receptiveness to NPM in South Africa was very unevenly spread among 
government departments, with the Department of Transport notably almost 
denuding its departmental organisation structure to form a number of public entities 
that took over the bulk of the departmental functions  (Fraser-Moleketi, 2006). From 
2002 however there were some indications that the currency of the New Public 
Management, specifically in the South African public service, was declining  (van 
Dyk-Robertson, 2008). This was concomitant with the general decline of the 
currency of NPM as the dominant management philosophy in the Anglo-Saxon 
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and in the early years of the 21st Century, as well as keen awareness of the 
mounting social and political costs that they entailed’  (Ziller, 2003 cited in 
Moleketi, 2003:467). NPM’s claimed benefits also reportedly tended to have very 
ambiguous results on the ground. This international shift in thinking also impacted 
on the South African discourse on public administration and management, as noted 
by former South African minister of public service and administration, Geraldine 
Fraser-Moleketi: 
After a period in which the state have [sic] been vilified, we have now entered 
an era globally, in which the legitimacy of a strong and healthy public sphere 
is once again being restored and treasured (MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SERVICE 
AND ADMINISTRATION, 2007: pages unnumbered). 
 
Elsewhere she argues: 
 
This instinct that we have had about the excessive and uncritical embracing of 
NPM is proving to have been the correct one. Recent anecdotal evidence from 
New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom, all of them strong advocates 
of NPM, is that in more recent years they now have to re-build the state, the 
centre of state, the bureaucracy and the systems that goes with large 
organisations in order to undo some of the consequences that they are 
experiencing of their earlier decisions to minimalise the role of the State and 
to handle the complexity of the landscape in terms of public service delivery 
that has been created through outsourcing, agentization, privatisation, and so 
forth  (Fraser-Moleketi, 2003: pages unnumbered) 
 
Addressing the fourth Commonwealth Heads of African Services Forum, Reverend 
Chikane concurs: 
Efforts to improve service delivery in African countries are located within the 
context of a globalised world where developed countries have sought to 
impose an approach, which dictates the reduced role for a ‘right-sized’ state. 
Within public administration New Public Management, espousing 
management ‘autonomy’ and lean bureaucracies was fashionable for 
sometime in established democracies. The challenges we face in South Africa 
… have led us to move from this ‘narrow approach’ or ‘prescription’ in favour 
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prominent role in mobilising the society’s resources towards developmental 
priorities  (Chikane, 2007: pages unnumbered) 
 
This move towards strengthening the capacity and organisation of the state is 
exemplified, among other things, in the conceptualisation and implementation of a 
Single Public Service Initiative, which ‘seeks to bring together all three spheres of 
government into a cohesive set of institutions to integrate and accelerate service 
delivery to the poor in South Africa’  (MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SERVICE AND 
ADMINISTRATION, 2007: pages unnumbered). This is interestingly similar to what 
governments in Anglo-Saxon countries governments have done, namely embarking 
on “joined-up government” initiatives to supposedly counter NPM’s fragmenting 
tendencies, and restore government coordination. Interestingly, NPM in the first 
place was meant to overcome problems of executive fragmentation and 
administrative centralisation – the so-called key impediments to governance and 
public sector performance  (Aucoin, 1995). Administrative centralisation is exactly 
what the ‘whole-of-government’ and ‘joined-up’ initiatives seem to reinforce. 
 
The rationale for administrative centralisation appears to be in some ways no 
different from the arguments advanced in favour of the adoption of NPM. 
Elaborating on the motive for strengthening the centre of government Fraser-
Moleketi for instance notes:  
This approach of creating a superbly aligned and integrated public service is 
underpinned by an effort to create government institutions that are accessible, 
efficient, representative, accountable, sustainable and responsive to service 
delivery needs  (MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SERVICE AND ADMINISTRATION, 
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Red tape or unnecessary bureaucracy – one of the reasons why NPM gained 
ascendancy over traditional public administration - is still cited among the critical 
issues hampering service delivery in South Africa. While rules, regulations and 
procedures are acknowledged to be ‘necessary to ensure equitable and fair access 
to services, and to guarantee good governance’ they are also reviled for being 
‘inefficient and costly’, thus imposing an ‘unjustifiable administrative burden on 
both citizens and public servants’  (Fraser-Moleketi, 2004: pages unnumbered). 
Elsewhere, Moleketi further acknowledges:  
We can no-way claim the we have escaped these [NPM] trends completely, 
but I can assure you that there is a great awareness building up at a political 
level, as well as within international think tanks on the domain of 
administration and governance of the potential threats posed by some of the 
notions underpinning the NPM paradigm to sustainable development and 
sound administration within the developmental state. These insights are not 
necessarily yet entirely shared at the level of our managers, and, judging from 
the conference papers that I get to read and a good share of the academic 
publications in the field, it would seem even less so at the level of the Public 
administration discipline across South Africa  (Fraser-Moleketi, 2003: pages 
unnumbered) 
 
The continuities with the NPM ideology are thus clearly evident. Just as the highly 
regulated bureaucratic model under apartheid did not fade with introduction of 
democracy, the move towards centralisation has not made NPM practices simply 
disappear  (Mc Lennan, 2008). This fits well with the path dependence theory of 
public administration, where ‘the past runs as a thread through and influences the 
direction of implementation in the present’  (Fraser-Moleketi, 2006:15-16). In other 
words, ‘no reform or transformation process is left untouched by its predecessor 
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1.2. Research approach, objectives, methodology, scope and potential limitations 
 
Of primary interest to this study is the role of the NPM in the process of 
transforming and reforming the public service in democratic South Africa, with a 
view to highlight the extent to which it has percolated the reform agenda. The 
discussion revolves around mutually related NPM ideas such as the reduction of the 
size of the public service, the devolution of managerial responsibility, the 
redefinition of the citizen as a ‘customer’, and alternative service delivery methods. 
  
This primarily is a desktop study, based on the review of the literature, using 
secondary literature sources such as electronic and hard copy journals and books, 
newspaper articles, policy papers, dissertations, conference reports and general 
reports on the subject of the NPM. These are used as evidence to support the 
following key arguments: 
 
• South Africa adopted some NPM concepts as key public sector reform tools 
• Some of these concepts appear to have had adverse impacts on the 
functioning of the public service 
• In some cases, such as in the case of the Batho Pele initiative, managerial 
autonomy, and Public-Private Partnerships lack of success seems to be more 
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The key objectives of this study are thus to: 
 
• Outline the evolution of NPM internationally by means of a literature review 
• Examine the significance of NPM in the South African public service reform 
process from 1994 till 2008 
 
The bulk of this research was undertaken between 2007 and 2008. New NPM 
developments after 2008 are therefore not captured. The study discusses the NPM 
primarily as it pertains to the Public Service in democratic South Africa, though it is 
also relevant for other spheres of government outside the Public Service. The Public 
Service is defined and understood in terms of the Public Service Act of 1994, which 
excludes the local government sphere and parastatals. 
 
A potential limitation of this research is that the information generated through the 
analysis of the mentioned body of literature is not authenticated with primary data 
that could have been obtained by means of, for instance, interviews with key actors 
in the public sector reform process in democratic South Africa. Also, at the time of 
writing, very little previous systematic research on NPM in South Africa existed. 
Lacking a systematic body of work from which to build on, this work is also 
vulnerable to the general criticism that South African Public Administration 
research ‘lacks cumulativeness in that little attention is paid to earlier studies and 
little effort is given to build upon that earlier work’  (Cameron, 2005:16). To 
minimise this shortcoming it was ensured that the little available local work on 
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1.3. Chapter summary 
 
This chapter was an introduction into some of the public management reform ideas 
associated with the New Public Management, and how these found expression in 
the public service of democratic South Africa, as well as their subsequent decline in 
importance in favour of a strong centralising state. The arguments for this shift 
towards a strong centre are no different from those advanced for the adoption of the 
NPM. This shift also suggests a neat linear break with the NPM past, which the 
chapter contested on the basis that it downplays the continuities or residues that are 
known to remain from previous dominant management paradigms or philosophies. 
The chapter also outlined the study’s approach, objectives, as well as limitations. 
The next chapter presents a comprehensive review of the literature on NPM to set 
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CHAPTER TWO 





The emergence of the NPM style of public management in recent decades, and 
how it was spread across the globe, has been a significant development within both 
the discipline and practice of public administration. Rising as a modern 
development within the Public Management tradition and as a theory of governing 
in general, the NPM has been highly influential in academic and practitioner 
discourse  (UNDESA, 2005). Researchers have noted how the term New Public 
Management is in fact a misnomer due the fact that it has been at the forefront of 
public management discourse for over three decades, and therefore can hardly be 
called ‘new’  (Olowu, 2002). However, it may be argued that though the literature 
is growing rapidly it is certainly still new. The bulk of it is less than three decades 




In general NPM has been labelled as a global paradigm change concerning the 
control and organization of the public service  (Christensen & Laegreid, 1999). This 
definition makes two claims: that NPM was a global trend and that it was a 
paradigm shift. Both claims are seriously contested. The idea that NPM entailed a 
paradigm shift away from public administration is reportedly based on the 
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of the traditional paradigm and thereby causing a scientific revolution  (Rommel & 
Christiaens, 2006).  
 
It has been averred that NPM cannot be a new paradigm because there ‘is no set of 
fundamental principles or values sufficiently shared and integrated by a community 
of specialists so as to offer a correct representation of reality’  (Cabrero, 2005). 
Some critics have eventually reduced NPM from a paradigm shift to an Anglo-
Saxon management fad  (Van Dooren, 2006). Whether NPM is a global trend is also 
disputed. Politt (2001 in  (Van Dooren, 2006:42)) for instance ‘finds convergence 
between countries in reform strategies a useful myth.’ 
 
In a more specific sense the NPM has been defined as a move to more hands on 
professional management in the public sector, more explicit standards and measure 
of performance, greater emphasis on output rather than input control, a shift to a 
disaggregation of units in the public sector, a shift to greater competition and 
contract based delivery of services, a stress on private sector style of management 
practice, and greater parsimony in resource use  (Hood, 1991). 
 
In essence NPM came to be seen as the ‘transfer of business principles and 
management techniques from the private into the public sector, symbiotic with and 
based on a neo-liberal understanding of State and economy’  (Wolfgang, 2005). 
This also meant a redefinition of ‘citizens as consumers of products or customers of 
public service providers’  (Hambleton, 2004:2). It was assumed that this customer 
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one of NPM’s major sources of criticism as later discussed under the subsection on 
key objections against the movement.  
 
2.3. Origins of NPM  
 
NPM is thought to have evolved from a wide variety of theoretical approaches 
including Public Choice Theory and Public Management – the latter being the 
public sector reform paradigm that preceded NPM  (Gruening, 1998). Public 
Choice Theory on the other hand is ‘directed toward the study of politics based on 
economic principles [where] people are assumed to be well-informed maximisers 
with logically consistent preferences and an instrumental and self-regarding 
behaviour’  (Van Dooren, 2006:75). Four principles that underline public choice 
theory have been identified: 
 
(i) Public sector actors or officials behave as if they maximise their own interests; 
(ii) All social entities are fundamentally sets of individual actors; (iii) Political 
interaction is to be based on voluntary exchange; (iv) Politics as voluntary 
exchange requires the making of an economic institution that is to guide the 
relationship between the state and the individual; (v) Citizens provide rulers or 
the state with resources and power for which they expect a return of goods and 
services as well as laws regulating society that matches what they are giving up  
(Ayee, 2005). 
 
The idea that NPM involves a marriage of the ‘new institutional economics’ and 
business-type managerialism is attributed to Hood (1991) who traces the former to  
 
‘the post-World II development of public choice, transactions cost theory, and 
principal agent theory – from the early work of Black (1958) and Arrow (1963) 
to Niskanen’s (1971) landmark theory of bureaucracy and the spate of later 
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The manifest influence of the public choice and principal agent theories on NPM 
has raised questions about whether the doctrine is really new to begin with. This 
formed the basis for the charge that the NPM ‘was in fact largely old private 
management, which is often different from what successful modern private sector 
companies try for …’  (Gasper, 2002:25). Gasper (2002:26) further submits that 
‘NPM presented itself as “New” in order to divert attention from the mixed record 
of previous attempts on the same line …’ Aucoin (1990) also asserts, ‘[i]t should be 
noted that … the ideas now in fashion in management circles are themselves a 
reformulation of traditional models in management theory’  (Aucoin, 1990:118).  
 
Some theorists however have averred that by virtue of being fashionable ‘NPM can 
be seen as a modern idea, even though most of its content has been around for 
some time and are modulations on existing practices’  (Skelley, 2002:181). 
Consequently some critics have dismissed the movement ‘as worthless nostrums or 
old ideas dressed up in new clothes’  (Jones & Kettl, 2003:8). A counterargument to 
this has been the view that ‘it is simply too early to tell whether NPM is or is not a 
new “paradigm” … [and that] it is not clear whether the question has meaning and 
it certainly is clear that not enough information is available to try to answer it’  
(Jones & Kettl, 2003:13). The authors are evidently NPM apologists. 
 
As their characterisation highlights, both Public Choice and Public Management 
have contradicting perceptions of public administrators – the former taking the 
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and dishonesty, and the latter believing that administrators are fundamentally good 
people trapped in bad systems  (Rolland, 2005). Public Management therefore 
advances that public managers should be empowered rather than extensively 
policed. This contradiction within the NPM is yet to be resolved  (Rolland, 2005).  
 
Almost all public sector reforms have been aimed at improving the performance of 
government. Which means the provision of better services, as well as the 
development of more thoughtful policy analysis  (UNDESA, 2005). The NPM 
shifted the emphasis significantly from the traditional public administration model 
of public service delivery, based on hierarchy, centralisation and direct control, to a 
market-based public service management culture  (Ayee, 2005). Criticism of the 
Bureaucratic Model, according to Monteiro (2002:9), 
 
Centred on the fact that it concerned itself more with proper procedures than 
with objectives, put respect for the rules above efficiency, and addressing 
citizens’ interests was an effect of the work of administration and not the 
driving force an raison d’être of public administration. Tenured employment 
… was seen as encouraging inertia and stifling motivations as well as 
resistance to change. 
 
Hughes (1998) likewise proclaims: 
 
[T]he traditional model of administration is obsolete and has been effectively 
replaced by a new model of public management. This change represents a 
paradigm shift from a bureaucratic model of administration to a market model 
of management closely related to that of the private sector. Managerial 
reforms means a transformation, not only of public management, but also of 
the relationships between market and government, government and the 
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Thus, according to NPM proponents ‘the launch of the new public management 
was a frank recognition that hierarchy and authority, in all their variations and 
reforms, had reached their limits’  (Jones & Kettl, 2003:10). Under NPM the 
traditional focus on inputs shifted to a focus on outputs and outcomes, such as 
clearly defined goals, targets and quantitative indicators of success. The shift has 
been associated with the rise of right-wing politics1 where the state came to be seen 
as part of the problem, due to its huge scope, size and scope, among other things  
(Olowu, 2002). Economic and fiscal crises including the alleged crisis of legitimacy 
of the welfare state  (Rolland, 2005), as well as the advancement in information and 
computing technology, have also been understood to be drivers of NPM reforms  
(Tolofari, 2005).  
 
Because new movements usually present themselves as an antithesis to mainstream 
practices  (Van Dooren, 2006), it is no surprise that the NPM presented itself as an 
alternative to the traditional bureaucratic model. However, as noted earlier, 
More recently, those countries that adopted NPM most enthusiastically (such as 
Australia and New Zealand) have rediscovered some of the virtues of traditional 
public administration and have adapted their reformed, marketised systems 
accordingly  (UNDESA, 2005:15).  
 
As already seen in the introductory chapter, these countries are now engaged in 
initiatives that seek to strengthen the centre of government, with politicians being 
encouraged to ‘stick to their core business, that is, developing new policies to 
                                            
1 The rise of right-wing (sometimes called New Right or neoliberal) politics is associated with the era 
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realise (political goals)’  (Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002:268). The market or quasi-
market entities would then supposedly take care of policy implementation.  
 
2.4. Characteristics of NPM 
 
Assessing whether the new public management actually constitutes an identifiable 
set of ideas has been deemed a daunting problem. In fact, variations within the 
literature on NPM suggest that there is no ‘complete agreement on what elements 
or units of analysis constitute New Public Management’  (Roberts & Bradley, 1999: 
pages unnumbered). Different scholars emphasize different elements. Although 
there is no consensus on what NPM actually constitutes, it has been articulated 
alongside progressive phrases such as: reinventing government, re-engineering, 
revitalisation of the public service, organisational transformation, total quality 
management, paradigm shift, entrepreneurship, empowerment, results over process, 
downsizing, rightsizing, lean and mean, contracting out, off-loading or outsourcing, 
steering rather than rowing, empowering rather than serving and earning rather than 
spending  (Ayee, 2005).  
 
The UN likewise identifies privatization, expenditure cuts, labour market 
deregulation, and other various forms of structural adjustments, as some of the 
NPM’s distinctive features  (UNDESA, 2005). The UN Report further construes NPM 
as a particular doctrine, as well as a distinctive tool-kit of administrative techniques, 
which include competition, marketisation, autonomisation, deregulation and 
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organizations into ‘corporatized units around products’ funded separately and 
interacting with one another on an ‘arms-length’ basis (Appana, 2003). Hood 
(1991) provides a useful tabulation of the doctrinal components of NPM: 
 
Table 1: Doctrinal components of new public management 





the public sector 
Active, visible, discretionary 
control of organisations from 
named persons at the top, 'free 
to manage' 
Accountability requires clear 
assignment of responsibility 





and measures of 
performance 
 
Definition of goals, targets, 
indicators of success, 
preferably expressed in 
qualitative terms, especially for 
professional services (…) 
 
Accountability requires clear 
statement of goals; efficiency 







Resource allocation and 
rewards linked to measured 
performance; break up of 
centralised bureaucracy-wide 
personnel management 





units in the public 
sector 
 
Break up of formerly 
'monolithic' units, unbundling 
of U-form management systems 
into corporatized units around 
products, operating on 
decentralised 'one-line' 
budgets and dealing with one 
another on an arms length basis 
Need to create 'manageable' 
units, separate provision and 
production interests, gain 
efficiency advantages of use 
of contract or franchise 
arrangements inside as well 
as outside the public sector  
5 
 
Shift to greater 
competition in 
the public sector 
Move to term contracts and 
public tendering procedures 
Rivalry as the key to lower 
costs and better standards 
6 
Stress on private-




Move away from military-style 
'public service ethic', greater 
flexibility in hiring and 
rewards; greater use of PR 
techniques 
Need to use 'proven' private 
sector management tools in 
the public sector 
7 
Stress on greater 
discipline and 
 
Cutting direct costs, raising 
Need to check resource 
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parsimony in 
resource use 
labour discipline, resisting 
union demands, limiting 
'compliance costs' to business 
'do more with less' 
Source:  (Hood, 1991) 
 
Many of these precepts have endured, but there is yet no satisfactory account of 
why this is the case (Hood, 1991). Hood (1991) offers four possible explanations. 
The first is a simple ‘whim of a fashion’ explanation, which submits that NPM had 
many of the necessary qualities of administrative reform fads and fashions, namely 
‘cheap, superficial and popular.’ This however, it is argued, is not enough to 
explain why NPM coalesced and ‘caught on’ the way it did  (Hood, 1991). A 
second ‘equally sceptical explanation’ is an idea of NPM as a  
 
‘‘cargo cult’ phenomenon – the endless rebirth, in spite of repeated failures, of 
the idea that substantive success (‘cargo’) can be gained by the practice of 
particular kinds of (managerial) ritual’  (Hood, 1991:7). 
 
While this explanation does ‘better accommodate the recurring or enduring features 
of many aspects of NPM’, it apparently ‘cannot tell us why the NPM variant of the 
recurring public management ‘cargo cult’ appeared at the time it did, rather than 
any other’  (Hood, 1991:7). A third possible explanation is a ‘synthesis of opposites’ 
interpration, which sees NPM as a fusion of opposites:  
 
[T]he German tradition of state-led economic growth by professional public 
managers [rooted in cameralism]’ and the ‘Anglo-Saxon tradition of liberal 
economics, allied with a concern for match self-interest with duty in 
administration [rooted in utilitarianism]  (Hood, 1991:7).  
 
While viewed as less sceptical, this Hegelian marriage of opposite attrations on its 
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administration traditions should have united at this particular time rather than any 
other’  (Hood, 1991:7). NPM as a ‘response to a set of special social conditions 
developing in the long peace in the developed countries since World War II, and 
the unique period of economic growth which accompanied it’  (Hood, 1991:7) is 
Hood’s final and apparently more credible interpretation of why NPM found favor.  
 
Originally, some of the ideas associated with NPM were allegedly business-like in 
character. In this regard the NPM appeal seemed to derive from the idea of 
introducing to the public sector an allegedly new set of universally attractive tools 
and principles that were previously thought to be exclusively germane to the private 
sector. The very term “management” is thought to derive from private sector 
experience, ‘denoting  … a concern for the use of resources to achieve results in 
contrast to the presumed focus of “administration” as the adherence to formalised 
processes and procedures’  (Aucoin, 1990:118). Running the public sector was 
allegedly the same undertaking as running any other business, the key assumptions 
being that, 
 
• Government, like private business firms, supplies goods and services in 
response to “customer demand”; 
• Government outputs are, like private sector equivalents, fairly well-defined, 
change in response to demand, and are quantifiable; 
• The citizen, as a ‘customer’ of public goods and services, has a 
choice/preference, which s/he expresses during elections and routinely at the 
market place; 
• Inputs into government operations are scarce, and this dictates the need to 
produce more with less; 
• If a performance cannot be measured, it cannot be managed; 
• The structure and process of government can easily be adapted to respond to 
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• To ensure that public management is able to respond to challenges as or 
before they unfold, government leaders must be empowered to make 
decisions and allocate resources  (UNDESA, 2003:4). 
 
Thus NPM apparently not only advocates for the adoption of the techniques of the 
private sector, but also its values. The special requirements of management in the 
public sector including such conceptions as ‘public spirit’, ‘general interest’ and 
‘common good’ are not given as much consideration. The NPM notion of ‘generic 
management’ consequently does not allow for any specificity of the public sector  
(Pierre, 2007). Through the application of market principles, public sector 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness would presumably be a thing of the past. The 
market was believed to be an ‘effective allocator of resources, an efficient co-
ordinating mechanism, a rational decision-making process and, in addition 
encourages resourcefulness and enterprise’  (Larbi, 1999:3).  
 
An important premise of NPM is the idea that public sector provision is inefficient 
and often ineffective, that it leads neither to cost containment nor to quality 
improvements  (UNECA, 2003). The NPM appeal therefore lay in the idea that 
private sector management is superior to public sector management, and in this 
comparison public sector bureaucrats ‘are perceived essentially as administrators, 
and thus are considered inferior to their private sector equivalents who “manage” 
their organisations’  (Aucoin, 1990:118). Consequently ‘the assumption that public 
sector organisations need to learn from private sector organisations and companies’  
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Finally, NPM has also been associated with inspiring a number technological 
innovations and tools to expedite government service delivery. Marked improved in 
information technology, in theory, may be associated with heightening ‘the chance 
that any corruption will be detected, and hence deterred’  (DeLeon & Green, 2000: 
pages unnumbered). One of these tools is e-government, which is understood as an 
innovative measure that helps narrow the gap between citizens and the services 
they require (MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SERVICE AND ADMINISTRATION, no date). 
One-stop shops that provide a variety of government services in one place - 
including payment of grants, welfare services, vital registration, health, education, 
employment and other basic services - are an example of the practical applications 
of the e-government model.  
   
2.5. Implementation of NPM 
 
Three schools of thought on NPM implementation studies have been distinguished  
(Van Dooren, 2006). The first is environmental determinism, which characterizes 
the implementation of NPM as a response to external pressure. This school of 
thought consists in two strands: symbolists who ‘would state that pressure arises 
from reform myths that exert isomorphic pressures – the pressure to align success 
stories as a way of dealing with uncertainty and as a substitute for success’; and 
rationalists who ‘would attribute external pressure to the superior technical 
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According to the second school of thought NPM is a ‘product of the path-
dependent national historical-institutional context’  (Van Dooren, 2006:244). The 
implication of this view is that successful NPM implementation rests on ‘the 
consistency of the underlying values of the reform with the existing values in the 
administrative system’  (Van Dooren, 2006:244). Finally, the third school of thought 
construes reform in terms of the political-administrative structure, i.e. ‘the main 
features of the polity, the form of government, and the formal structure of decision-
making affect the country’s capacity to realize administrative reforms’  (Van 
Dooren, 2006:244). 
 
2.6. Major New Public Management Critiques 
 
Until very recently NPM has enjoyed an overwhelming appeal amongst public 
sector reformers around the world. This was born out of the promise that NPM will 
lead to greater efficiency, effectiveness and economy in management in the public 
sector  (Appana, 2003). The focus on better service, lower costs, innovation, profit-
orientation, better pay, higher dividend payouts, were also highly attractive 
proposals for the public at large  (Appana, 2003). The NPM appeal however has 
somewhat diminished, in conjunction with growing dissatisfaction with some key 
NPM concepts and practices. Today NPM is the focal point of disagreement on 
public administration reform  (Dunn & Miller, 2007), and lacking ‘a single definitive 
‘manifesto’, the ideas of its critics are equally scattered among a variety of often 
ephemeral sources’  (Hood, 1991:8). Certain NPM characteristics, including those 
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2.6.1. Emperor’s New Clothes? 
 
NPM has been asserted to be a mere product of the style-conscious 1980’s, and 
thus all hype and no substance – like the Emperor’s New Clothes in the Hans 
Anderson story  (Hood, 1991). According to this criticism it would seem that an 
NPM corrective would be along the lines of  
‘giving NPM some real substance in order to move from ‘smoke and mirrors’ 
to reality – for example in making output contracts between ministers and 
chief executives legally binding or in breaking up the public service 
employment structure …’  (Hood, 1991:9).  
 
NPM is also said to have ‘damaged the public service while being ineffective in its 
ability to deliver on its central claim to lower costs … of service’  (Hood, 1991:9). 
The main result has thus largely been ‘an aggrandizement of management and a 
rapid middle-level bureaucratisation of new reporting systems (as in the remarkable 
growth of the performance indicator industry)’  (Hood, 1991:9). The NPM remedy 
that can be deduced from this type of criticism relates to 
[A]pplying to the NPM system the disciplines that it urges upon service-
delivery bureaucracies but so signally fails to impose on itself – particularly in 
the strict resource control and the imposition of a battery of published and 
measurable performance indicators to determine the overall costs and benefits 
of the system’  (Hood, 1991:9).  
 
NPM’s ‘professed claims to promote the ‘public good’ (of cheaper and better public 
services to all)’ has also been criticised for being ‘actually a vehicle for 
particularistic advantage’ in the sense that, 
NPM is a self-serving movement designed to promote the career interests of an 
elite group of ‘new managerialists’ (top managers and officials in central 
controlling departments, management consultants and business schools) rather 
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Disproportionate cut back on ‘managerial’ rather than on ‘operational’ staff and 
measures to ‘empower’ consumers, for instance by new systems of direct 
democracy  (Hood, 1991), are the obvious remedies implicit in this criticism.  
 
2.6.2. Transferability of private sector approaches 
 
NPM was assumed to be the only right way for both private and public sector 
growth and efficiency, even though there was no established empirical basis for that 
assumption (Christensen & Laegreid, 1999). Critics have extensively addressed the 
issue of the transfer of models from private to public. Skelley (2002:180) for 
instance notes that ‘experience with a set of techniques in the private sector, in the 
market, does not necessarily predict the effect of these reforms in the public sector 
context.’ For starters the customer in the public sector is difficult to identify and 
that, for the most part, customers and citizens are not the same  (Olowu, 2002). Van 
Dooren (2006:74) further adds that ‘output in the public sector does not 
straightforwardly lead to outcome.’ 
 
Citing Metcalf (1993:292) Pallot (1996:pages unnumbered) emphasises that:  
 
 … governments, by accident or design, have far more difficult management 
problems than any business would attempt to tackle, [and] if the basis of 
public management reform until now has been imitation of business 
management, the challenge for the 1990’s is to move to innovation; the 
development of new methods of management appropriate to the distinctive 
needs of government. 
 
Other critics have questioned the empirical validity of NPM in terms of its claims of 
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organisations rarely operate in the manner presented in NPM’  (Olowu, 2002:7). 
The idea that private sector techniques are taken over without pre-existing evidence 
that those techniques work in even in the private sector (Rolland, 2005) has been 
another serious criticism. In this regard it has been concluded:  
… the opinion that business organisations have succeeded much better in 
fighting bureaucracy and bureaucratisation than government organisations, is 
based more on speculation and prejudice than on the results of empirical 
research  (Kolthoff, Huberts, & van den Heuvel, 2006:4). 
 
2.6.3. Opacity and loss of political accountability 
 
NPM is also charged with opacity with regard to specifying the means of achieving 
its presumed colourful outcomes. This opacity is argued to result from the fact that 
NPM does not actually present any specific proposal that qualifies as being 
distinctly different from existing private sector management approaches, despite 
being proposed as a management approach  (Appana, 2003). 
 
Therkildsen (2001:8) also notes that ‘[w]hile NPM doctrines stipulate how the 
public sector can be made more efficient and accountable, they do not focus on 
how to bring about the prescribed changes.’ He further argues that there is ‘plenty 
of empirical evidence to show that even in consolidated democratic states 
[presumably those that have followed the NPM-path] there are major deficits in 
accountability’  (Therkildsen, 2001:7). Furthermore there is a concern that, 
 
Instead of being answerable to social welfare, citizens’ rights, poverty 
eradication, impartiality, fairness, representation, and justice, public 
governance is increasingly accountable for accelerating the economic growth-
rate, boosting efficiency and productivity, encouraging competition, 
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This apparently undue NPM emphasis on procedural economic criteria over 
substantive public concerns thus, in Haque’s view, results in instrumental standards 
of public accountability. That this accountability for market-based economics could 
translate into accountability for citizens’ rights is an assumption that Haque 
seriously questions. For Haque, these two forms of accountability cannot co-exist, 
as the accountability for competition and productivity is set to displace 
accountability for welfare and justice. Such criticism however surely needs not to 
negate the significance of economic efficiency, economy and competition as 
criteria of accountability.  
 
NPM reforms have also been ‘blamed for facilitating ethical misconduct and 
corruption in industrialised countries’  (Polidano, 1999:11). Dunleavy & Hood 
(1994) understand this to be the egalitarian critique of NPM - in terms of cultural 
theory (see Table 2). The increasing corruption is thought to result from the more 
discretionary freedom NPM reforms give to public sector organisations and 
individual public sector employees  (Ormond & Löffler, 1998). It is also thought that 
there could be evidence that NPM elements contribute to: 
 
• A decline of an “ethics infrastructure”, and of alienation and insecurity of 
public servants, 
• Intensified “market for contracts” and rent-seeking behaviour of market 
participants, and  
• The possibility of undermining supervision and control of the administration 
due to the decentralised and fragmented structure of purchaser-provider 
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In his exploration of the various forms of administrative designs, Hood (1991:15) 
comes to a similar conclusion, noting that, ‘[i]f NPM is a design for putting frugality 
at a centre stage, it may at the limit be less capable of ensuring honesty and 
resilience in public administration.’ This is because NPM  
 
[R]ecipes to some degree removed devices instituted to ensure honesty and 
neutrality in the public service in the past (fixed salaries, rules of procedure, 
permanence of tenure, restraints on the power of management, clear lines of 
division between public and private sectors) (Hood, 1991:16). 
 
Gratto, Preston, & Snilsberg, (2002:4) on the other hand identify two major 
implications, which the NPM has for corruption: 
First, NPM creates the potential for corruption in a wide range of actors and 
that the flexibility of these networks makes it more difficult to maintain 
accountability and oversight. Secondly and perhaps more importantly, the line 
between the government and private actors becomes increasingly blurred in 
NPM. 
 
On the same theme of NPM and corruption Argyriades, (2003:529) also 
pronounces: 
 
In most other places, however, the cult of flexibility and of ‘results over 
process’, assiduously promoted by NPM, had mostly negative outcomes. It 
helped create conditions in which corruption thrives, indeed becomes 
accepted as part of everyday life … It is the single-minded pursuit of these 3Es 
[economy, efficiency and effectiveness] tied to an opportunistic quest for 
short-term gains that have too often led to the spread of corruption, the abuse 
of power and the neglect of values which lie at the very core of public service 
professionalism reinforcing public trust … In several parts of the world, the 
decline of public service and the retreat of the state have certainly contributed 
to an appreciable rise in corruption and a corresponding fall in democratic 
standards and public trust. 
 
The possibility that NPM facilitates corrupt behaviour is also thought to arise from 
inadequate control in a deregulated context, where line managers can take 
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Maravic & Reichard, 2003). The opportunities presented in NPM’s ‘marketise’ 
strategy where public and private interests interact  (von Maravic & Reichard, 2003) 
is also thought to be a breeding ground for corruption.  
 
Arguments of NPM as the facilitator of unethical conduct have on the other hand 
been criticised for being,  
 
[B]ased on individual perception or even prejudice than on facts [as] there is 
little if any empirical study comparing ethical conduct before and after major 
public management reforms’  (Ormond & Löffler, 1998, pages unnumbered). 
 
Anticipating this kind objection, Hood (1991:16) does qualify his prediction by 
complicating it further: 
 
Even if further research established that NPM was clearly associated with the 
pursuit of frugality, it remains to be fully investigated whether such success are 
bought at the expense of guarantees of honesty and fair dealing … 
 
A relatively recent investigation of potential interrelationships between NPM 
reforms in the public sector and corrupt behaviour of public servants, politicians 
and providers of public services, also finds a gap between theoretical assumptions 
and missing empirical evidence  (von Maravic & Reichard, 2003). The authors 
conclude that ‘there is no evidence to suggest that NPM fosters corruption any more 
than does traditional public administration’ (p.84). A possible counter-argument 
here is the idea that having no evidence is not the same thing as not increasing 
corruption or the opportunity for corruption  (von Maravic & Reichard, 2003). 
 










Dissertation with corrections_04_09_2009 33 
 
The use of competition and marketisation was intended to motivate bureaucrats in 
the form of providing performance incentives. This derived from ‘the economic 
view that the utilities of bureaucratic officials motivate bureaucratic behaviour, and 
these must be manipulated by incentives to effect desired change’  (Skelley, 
2002:170). This led to more emphasis on monetary incentives, rather than non-
monetary ones. It is argued that this had the perverse effect of eroding  
 
 … core values in the public service ethos, built up over more than a century, 
including a concern for sound procedures, proper accountability of public 
servants to elected politicians, consistency of treatment and fairness, and a caring 
concern for the clients of services  (Hambleton, 2004:2). 
 
Competition and marketisation encouraged the seeking of personal gain from 
providing public services  (James, 2001). The marketisation of the public service has 
also been criticized for focusing on ‘changing bureaucrats’ behaviour rather than 
transforming the fundamental fibre of government’s structure and process’  (Skelley, 
2002:170). Under such conditions it reportedly becomes difficult to construct 
workable democratic administrative institutions in a civil service where the 
bureaucrats are driven solely by external incentives and private benefits 
(Christensen & Laegreid, 1999). 
 
The model of the market-oriented public manager has also been seen to be 
problematic for democratic governance because 
[I]t implies that public managers are motivated by self-interest and act 
opportunistically, a stark contrast to the ideal of the “ethical agents who 
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Market-orientation also entailed treating citizens as ‘customers’, a commercial term 
that ‘assumes an individualist orientation and fixed preference in contrast with the 
‘’public’’ assumption of political life’  (Kaboolian, 1998:191). While this ‘customer 
service strategy’ may have been of value to public manager ‘in addressing the 
heterogeneous tastes of diverse citizenry’  (Kaboolian, 1998:191), ‘it tends to reduce 
the social rights associated with collective citizenship to narrow commercial 
prerogatives of individual customers guided by an exchange relationship’  (Haque, 
2000:603). According to Haque, this is a reductionist conception of citizenship 
under which  
[P]ublic governance is accountable for the effective delivery of its services to 
customers who can pay, while it may remain indifferent towards low-income 
citizens who are not in a position to use such services due to their financial 
incapacity (Haque, 2000:603). 
 
Haque (2001:65) also laments that: 
 
[W]hile there has been an apparent eclipse in discourse regarding the 
publicness or public quality of public service, the recent transition towards a 
market-driven mode of government has created a serious challenge to such 
publicness. 
 
This publicness is diminished through the NPM’s erosion of public-private 
distinction, the shrinking socio-economic role of the state, narrowing composition 
of service recipients, the worsening condition of accountability and declining level 
of public trust (Haque, 2001). Haque contends that the impacts of market-led 
public sector reforms are likely to be more adverse in developing economies due to 
the high percentage of people living in poverty who are used to being dependent 
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Using empirical findings, Haque (2001) also associates market-led reforms in the 
public sector with decreasing public trust or confidence in the public service, 
including the confidence of public service employees themselves. Which runs 
counter to the idea that public sector reforms can assuage people’s anti-government 
sentiment and rejuvenate their confidence in government (Haque, 2001).   
 
2.6.5. The hybrid nature of NPM 
 
Its cultivation of economic values and objectives notwithstanding, the NPM 
concept is still viewed as loose and multifaceted, including different elements 
which comprise a kind of a shopping basket for reformers of public administration  
(Christensen & Laegreid, 1999). This hybrid character of NPM has arguably fostered 
a constellation of diverse concepts, which inevitably pull the NPM framework into 
different directions. A cited case in point is the tensions resulting from the 
centralizing tendencies inherent in contractualism, as against the devolutionary 
tendencies of managerialism  (Christensen & Laegreid, 1999). According to these 
authors the NPM’s mix of these tendencies renders it a double-edged-sword, which 
prescribes both centralization and devolution. This ultimately exacerbates the 
tension between public managers and elected officials.  
 
A similar paradox is advanced in Aucoin (1990) who has observed that the 
organisational principles that flow from public choice and managerialism are 
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which locates the problem of government administration in excessive bureaucratic 
power or what is known as the “bureaucratic ideal”. The solution therefore is that, 
[P]oliticians under representative government must seek to “tame” the 
bureaucracy via a concentration of power in the hands of elected 
representatives, aided to the degree necessary by political staff as advisers, 
political appointees to line management positions, or, at least, greater political 
attention to the staffing of the career bureaucracy itself  (Aucoin, 1990:126). 
 
The managerialist strand of NPM on the other hand laments the excessive controls 
on line managers in the bureaucracy and prescribes the “unleashing” of bureaucrats 
in line management positions as the solution to the problem. In this sense the 
bureaucrats are simultenously viewed as both the cause of the problem and the 
resolution to it  (Aucoin, 1990). In short, ‘public choice theory promotes 
centralisation, coordination and control, while the managerialist school of thought 
favours decentralisation, deregulation and delegation’  (Aucoin,1990:129). 
 
Using labels from cultural theory, Hood et al encapsulates NPM criticisms as 
follows: 
 
Table 2: Critiques of New Public Management 
Fatalist critique  Hierarchist critique  
NPM cannot alter basis dilemmas of public administration or 
provide free lunch 
NPM risks eroding system-wide 
cohesion, and putting the public 
sector out of control 
     
Remedy   Remedy  
None: but over-sell of management systems will be vulnerable 
to fatalist attack 
Strengthened central steering 
capacity, more obligations to 
consult, OCR not ACR contracts 
     
Individualist critique  Egalitarian critique 
NPM risks becoming a poor substitute for fully individualised 
contract rights 
NPM risks encouraging corruption, 
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officials, weaken accountability 
     
Remedy   Remedy  
More 'real contracts than quasi-contracts, more privatisation 
rather than corporatisation 
More citizen empowerment, more 
anti-corruption machinery, 
extension of model employer role, 
stricter contract blacklists 
Source:  (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994) 
 
2.7. Lessons learned 
 
There is very little consensus on the central feature that defines NPM. It is also not 
clear whether the doctrine represents a new organisational structure or simply a 
renaming of old ideas and practices. Furthermore, the number of NPM critics seems 
to be increasing compared those who are sympathetic to the NPM cause, which is 
consistent with the decrease in the NPM currency thesis and the belief that  
NPM has failed, for the most part, in achieving the goals set forth by its 
American and British advocates, particularly the goal of achieving more 
effective and efficient public organisations in developing countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(Dunn & Miller, 2007:350). 
 
The NPM doctrine is thus no longer a fashionable catch phrase, particularly in 
countries that have had extensive experimentations with it. The overall NPM reform 
agenda also appears fraught with inherent contradictions. First they have been 
implemented more vigorously in the developed world, which appears to need them 
the least. Their implementation is also contingent on the existence of a strong state, 
while the primary goal is actually to reduce the role of the state.  
 
It has also emerged form the literature review that NPM-oriented public 
administration reforms fail to appreciate that, in terms of accountability standards, 
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private sector’  (Haque, 2000:610). The private sector for instance is not bound by 
public norms such as representation, equality, impartiality, integrity, justice, and 
citizenship  (Haque, 2000). In short, NPM fails to account fully ‘for the special non-
business circumstances prevailing in the public sector’  (UNDESA, 2003:iii). These 
apparent failures explain why there has been such a backlash against the NPM. 
While the lessons of NPM in countries where it originated are ambiguous, the 
experience of NPM in developing countries is allegedly even more starkly so  
(UNDESA, 2005).  
 
However as NPM evaluations undergo more empirical tests, it is emerging that its 
results on the ground are actually mixed, particularly in its Anglo-Saxon industrial 
heartlands. Pollitt (2000) tentatively defines ‘results’ in terms of the following 
categories:  
 
• Savings (reduced budget appropriations); 
• Improved processes (e.g. faster, more accessible complaints procedures; 
quicker turn-round times for repairs or the processing of licences; ‘one-stop 
shops’ offering several services in one place); 
• Improved efficiency (better input/output ratios, e.g. more students graduate 
per full-time equivalent member of staff; the same number of drivers’ 
licences are issued with 20 per cent fewer staff); 
• Greater effectiveness (less crime, poverty, functional illiteracy; homelessness; 
drug abuse; gender or ethnic inequality; more new jobs created; more 
contented and trusting citizens, etc.); 
• An increase in the overall capacity/flexibility/resilience of the administrative 
system as a whole (e.g. through the recruitment and training of more skilled, 
more committed public servants). 
 
On the basis of these categories, which also have definitional problems of their 
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 … while there is evidence of specific improvements in particular instances, 
the general case for NPM as a solution to diverse problems of governance in 
many different countries is far less firmly established than is commonly 
supposed … Even in those cases where improved effectiveness can be 
demonstrated, there is usually considerable ambiguity as to what it should be 
attributed. The splendid coat of many colours envisaged by some reformers – 
slim, fast, effective, decentralized, open, trusted government – still lies more in 
the realms of hope and imagination than in demonstrated and warranted 
reality. 
 
Lynn (2001) also ‘contends that there is no agreed upon body of facts concerning 
the nature, extent and consequences of the changes brought about by NPM’  (Cited 
in Otenyo & Lind, 2006:504). Both the successes and failures of NPM-type reforms 
are thus not as clear-cut.  
 
2.8. Chapter summary 
 
This chapter presented a review of the international literature on NPM as means to 
set the context for the discussion of NPM in South Africa, which is the subject of 
subsequent chapters. The review looked at NPM in terms of its definition, origins, 
characteristics, implementation, criticisms and lessons learned. Conceptions of 
NPM as a global trend and as a paradigm shift are seriously contested. Public 
choice theory and Public Management are generally thought to be the intellectual 
and theoretical foundations of NPM.  
 
Actual content of NPM is disputed but is generally associated with reinventing 
government, re-engineering, revitalisation of the public service, organisational 
transformation, total quality management, paradigm shift, entrepreneurship, 
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contracting out, off-loading or outsourcing, steering rather than rowing, 
empowering rather than serving, earning rather than spending, privatization, 
expenditure cuts, labour market deregulation, competition, marketisation, 
autonomisation, deregulation and disaggregation, hands on professional 
management in the public sector, explicit standards and measures of performance, 
greater emphasis on output controls, shift to greater competition in the public 
sector, stress on private-sector styles of management practice, stress on greater 
discipline and parsimony in resource in use. External pressure, the historical-
institutional context and the political-administrative structure are among the 
variables influencing the implementation of NPM-type reforms.  
 
Criticisms of NPM are around its perceived lack of substance, promotion of the 
interests of the elite at the expense of operational staff and citizens, the uncritical 
embrace of private sector management techniques, being vague on how to achieve 
the promise outcomes, the loss of bureaucratic accountability, undue NPM 
emphasis on procedural economic criteria over substantive public concerns, 
facilitating unethical conduct and corruption, encouraging public servants to seek 
personal gain from public service, erosion of publicness in public service, and 
exacerbating the tension between public managers and elected public officials.  
 
Lessons learned and conclusions drawn from the literature review pointed to the 
general worldwide decline in NPM currency; the inherent contradictions within the 
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tenets is contingent upon the existence of a strong state; the failure of NPM to 
appreciate adequately the fundamental differences between the private and public 
sectors; and the confusion of NPM with similar yet distinct developments in public 
administration.  
 
Notwithstanding such criticisms, it cannot be denied that the NPM has inspired 
some positive movements in the public sector. For one it has facilitated a move 
towards more hands on professional management, which is more advantageous 
than the detached approach characteristic of public sector managers in the 
traditional bureaucratic era. Partly as a result of the NPM public sector 
organizations now have more explicit standards and measure of performance, 
which has meant that human resource issues, such as promotions for instance, are 
no longer determined based solely on seniority. The greater emphasis on output 
rather than input control has in some way helped bring public sector focus back on 
results of activities rather on the activities themselves. The NPM-inspired shift to 
greater competition and contract-based delivery of services has helped reduce the 
price of public goods and that has in turn generated greater parsimony in the use of 
public resources. The results of the NPM therefore are, at best, mixed. The next 
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CHAPTER 3 
NPM-TYPE PUBLIC SERVICE REFORMS IN DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA
 
In South Africa the ability of the public service to deliver and expand basic 
services will decide whether the country becomes a stable political economy 
driving economic development in Africa or remains a volatile country beset by 





An important part of South Africa’s democratic transformation in 1994, following 
the negotiated settlement between the National Party government and South 
Africa’s liberation movements, was the transformation of the Public Service. The 
impetus for the reform of the South African Public Service was arguably occasioned 
by two factors. One was the desire to correct problems brought about by old 
bureaucratic orthodoxy, maladministration and dysfunctional systems associated 
with the apartheid government.  
 
The other was the changing global economic order, particularly the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the associated economic system. Also, after many years of 
isolation from the global community the South African public administration 
machinery was rather outmoded and needed to be modernized.  Management 
experts however tended to use “modernization” and “best practice” as marketing 
tools in promoting New Public Management  (Fraser-Moleketi, 2006). 
 
On the transformation of apartheid structures front, the then new Government of 
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out of eleven public services that existed prior to 1994. Each of these was located in 
a particular geographical area and was served by no less than fifteen separate 
administrations, namely the central administration of the Republic of South Africa; 
the administration of the four provinces of the Republic; the administration of the 
six self-governing territories of Gazankulu, kaNgwane, kwaNdebele, kwaZulu, 
Lebowa and Qwaqwa; and the four ‘independent’ states of Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (Fifield, 1998). Summarising this process Fifield  
(1998:386) writes: 
This, in  essence, is rationalisation, which in the South African context meant 
the process of moving from a fragmented and dysfunctional system of 
administration, created during the apartheid era, to one which constitutes a 
balanced, integrated unity in which every component is essential for the 
effective functioning of the whole. The process is obviously linked to 
transformation and reform, while in sequence rationalisation precedes the 
two.  
 
Rationalization, which involved the establishment of a new legal framework for 
administration and the assignment of political executive powers for the 
administration of laws  (Fifield, 1998), was thus the precursor to the reform and 
transformation of the South African public service. It was during this process when 
new policy instruments and measures dealing with affirmative action were 
introduced  (Fifield, 1998), particularly when it became clear that ‘the ANC-led 
government could not make a clean break with the past as a result of the existence 
and retention of the entire apartheid administration’  (Fraser-Moleketi, 2006:18) due 
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The sunset clauses were part of the power-sharing mechanisms meant to protect the 
jobs of the then existing public servants for a specified amount of time (Cameron & 
Milne, 2008). This was a ‘deliberate action that would link the democratic 
dispensation to the apartheid state through the retention of public servants in 
various sectors including the police and the army’, as well as to ‘ensure stability in 
the administrative machinery of the country prior to the April 1994 elections’  
(Fraser-Moleketi, 2006:21).  
 
3.2. The rise of New Public Management 
 
The NPM was only one of many reform currents experienced in South Africa, 
particularly during the post-apartheid period. As Fraser-Moleketi (2006:15) notes: 
 
[T]he New Public Management (NPM) methodologies that were adopted in 
the South African reform effort were specifically seen as tools, contributing to 
building an effective and efficient administration, in order to achieve the 
governance goals of a democratic South Africa. There was never a deliberate 
strategy to adopt the NPM as an embodiment of a benchmark for public sector 
reform to be pursued uncritically.  
 
Both the desire to correct the problems of the apartheid administration and the 
changing global economic order arguably triggered the rise of NPM-type reforms in 
post-apartheid South Africa. The multi-party negotiations of the early 1990’s 
precipitated the need to advance a new form of public administration and 
management in South Africa  (Vil-Nkomo, 1998). This is when public 
administration academics and practitioners also began to talk of the need to break 
with the Public Administration of the apartheid period. This saw the adoption of the 
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Administration associated with the American ‘Minnowbrook’ movement  
(Fitzgerald, 1995). This new ‘paradigm’ was premised on the adaption to local 
circumstances of Osborne and Gabler’s Reinventing Government as well as on the 
critique of ‘wholly outdated’ principles and methods that made the South African 
public service a ‘bureaucratic, law-driven, hierarchical, multi-layered, 
departmentally fragmented, inward-oriented racial Oligarchy’  (Fitzgerald, 1995 
cited in Chipkin 2002:6).  
 
New Public Management thinking is thus evident in the early and late 1990’s in the 
movement to restructure public administration to forge a new post-apartheid public 
policy dispensation. The early 1990’s in particular was the time when NPM was 
also being adopted in the rest of the Commonwealth  (Dreschler, 2005). Fraser-
Moleketi (2006:23) also notes: 
The South African public service transformation experience came in at the tail 
end of the period in which the thinking on public sector reform internationally 
was under-going substantial change with shifts from the traditional Weberian 
approach to public administration and then to what has become know as the 
New Public Management. 
 
Found to be ‘structured along mechanical closed models of public and 
development administration’  (Presidential Review Commission, 1998:pages 
unnumbered), the apartheid bureaucracy was pronounced incompatible with the 
visions, values and aspirations of the new democratic government, namely 
[A] public service which is representative, coherent, transparent, efficient, 
effective, accountable and responsive to the needs of all … characterised by 
equity, quality, timeousness and a strong code of ethics’  (Ministry of Public 
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This vision is juxtaposed against the apartheid administration, which was reportedly 
characterised by over-centralised, hierarchical and rule-bound systems where: 
 
• Decision-making is diffused; 
• Focus is on inputs rather than outcomes; 
• Value for money is not encouraged; 
• Innovation and creativity are not rewarded; 
• Uniformity is rewarded above effectiveness and responsiveness; and 
• Inward-looking, inflexible attitudes, which are at odds with the visions of a 
public service, are encouraged  (Ministry of Public Service and 
Administration, 1997). 
 
It is well known that under apartheid the system of service provision was 
discriminatory and exclusionary, particularly towards the majority of black2 South 
Africans  (Ministry of Public Service and Administration, 1995). Racial and gender 
discrimination were particularly pronounced in services like housing, education 
and social pension entitlements. This is enough to understand why the ultimate goal 
of the South African transformation programme is, as if to heed Kroukamp’s (2003) 
warning, to improve service delivery. As Mokgoro (2003:4) also notes, 
A transformed South African public service will be judged by one criterion 
above all: its effectiveness in delivering services which meet the basic needs 
of all South African citizens.  
 
In many parts of the public service corruption and mismanagement were 
widespread  (Ministry of Public Service and Administration, 1995) – no doubt 
facilitated by the fact that the eleven administrations had different accounting and 
financial systems  (Presidential Review Commission, 1998). In its 2001 Report on 
the State of the Public Service, the PSC also notes that ‘[t]he apartheid state created 
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opportunities for corruption and mismanagement in a highly fragmented and 
repressive system’  (PSC, 2001:3). Enhanced accountability has been one of the 
explicit aims of all new public management reforms’  (Ormond & Löffler, 1998). In 
the literature however controlling corruption is not usually put forwardly explicitly 
as a reason why the pioneers of the new public management embarked on their 
reforms (Polidano, 1999).  
 
It is however precisely the problem most developing countries aim to address when 
NPM reforms are introduced. Clear accountability is usually associated with 
decreasing dangers of corruptive practices  (von Maravic & Reichard, 2003). Some 
commentators have noted that, ‘it is no co-incidence that the countries where the 
new public management has come the furthest are, as a whole, the least-corrupt 
political systems in the world’  (von Maravic & Reichard, 2003:87). New Zealand, a 
nation that is thought to have the most wide-scale adoption of NPM programmes, 
also has one of the most corruption-free political environment according to 
Transparency International  (DeLeon & Green, 2000). NPM thought thus, among 
other things, purports to increase the accountability of administration while 
improving its efficiency – the two issues most reforms in developing countries 
actually focus on. 
 
Transformation and administrative reform in democratic South Africa were thus 
fundamentally informed by these reform goals. The content of transformation and 
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the ANC government did not want to emulate  (Ministry of Public Service and 
Administration, 2007). Among the priority areas identified to realise the new 
government’s aspirations was  
 
[T]ransforming service delivery to meet basic needs and redress past 
imbalances; rationalisation and restructuring to ensure a unified, integrated 
and leaner public service; and institution building and management reforms to 
promote greater accountability and organisational and managerial 
effectiveness’  (Presidential Review Commission, 1998:pages unnumbered). 
 
Thus, while the conceptualisation of transformation and administrative reform 
varied across the public service  (Presidential Review Commission, 1998), there 
seemed to be convergence in emphasis on legislative, policy and other guidelines 
aimed at quality and professional service delivery as well as increased 
accountability. These guidelines included the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa (1996), the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (Ministry 
of Public Service and Administration, 1995), and the White Paper on Transforming 
Public Service Delivery (1997), also known as Batho Pele (a Sesotho term for 
‘people first’). These have been touted to be in accordance with modern and 
international ‘best-practice’ trends. This may have been slightly overstated but these 
guidelines have certainly been influential. The Constitution influences the 
organisation and functioning of many leading sectors within the public service 
thereby stipulating how public administration should function. For instance it states 
that, 
• A high standard of professional ethics be promoted and maintained; 
• Services be provided fairly, equitably, and without bias; 










Dissertation with corrections_04_09_2009 49 
• People’s needs be responded to; 
• The public be encouraged to participate in policy-making; and 
• [Public administration] be accountable, transparent and development-
oriented. 
 
These are the values, which the South African PSC (PSC) uses as a yardstick for 
measuring the performance of the South African public service. The Ministry of 
Public Administration on the other hand was envisaged as ‘a policy framework to 
guide the introduction and implementation of new policies and legislation aimed at 
transforming the South African public service’  (Ministry of Public Administration, 
1995:pages unnumbered).  
 
Another noteworthy document of this era was the Report of the Presidential Review 
Commission on the Reform and Transformation of the Public Service in South Africa 
(1998). The use of international specialists drawn from the Commonwealth was an 
important part of the Report’s methodology and this afforded the Commission an 
opportunity to engage with then current ‘best practice’ and international 
perspectives on Public Management Reform. Many of its proposals however seem 
not to have been adopted, particularly those relating to the re-configuration of 
ministries.  
 
Cameron (2005) on the other hand notes that the Commission recommendations 
were adopted in principle, which meant the adoption of some NPM ideas. 
Throughout the transformation and administrative process, the South African 
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management, to follow and adapt to the South African situation, ranging ‘from 
traditional bureaucratic models to neo-liberal models of public choice, based on 
the restructuring and contracting-out of state services’  (Ministry of Public Service 
and Administration, 1995:pages unnumbered).  While government professed to 
champion a model or approach known as the Strategic Change Management 
Approach  (Ministry of Public Service and Administration, 1995), which was 
proclaimed an alternative to the ‘traditional bureaucratic models or neoliberal 
models based on the restructuring and increasing contracting-out of state services’  
(Presidential Review Commission, 1998: pages unnumbered), there were a number 
of administrative reforms and management tools that appeared to resonate with the 
NPM doctrine, namely rightsizing, the strengthening of managerial responsibility, 
the redefinition of the citizen as a ‘customer’ and alternative service delivery 
methods.  
 
The White Paper on the Transformation of Public Service Delivery also notes that 
‘these tools are, broadly, the tools of the ‘new public service management’ (Ministry 
of Public Service and Administration, 1997:pages unnumbered). These tools are 
examined individually, with respect to the public service, whose remit excludes 
local government and parastatals. The intention is to highlight both the content of 
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Following the rationalisation process, which, as already noted, entailed fitting 
fifteen administrations made up of 195 departments into ten new administrations 
via the National Departments and the 9 Provincial Administrations, ‘there was a 
greater number of people in the employ of the new government than were 
realistically required to ensure effective administration and the provision of 
services’  (Fifield, 1998:389). So the challenge was ‘the need to ensure that the size 
of the Public Service is consistent with its functional responsibilities’  (Skweyiya, 
1998:pages unnumbered).  
 
This was the Commission’s interpretation of the spirit of the WPTPSD, which 
envisaged ‘determining the right size for a productive public service, involving the 
re-prioritisation and optimal allocation of human and other resources’  (Presidential 
Review Commission, 1998:pages unnumbered). It had been reasoned that ‘the total 
number of public servants in South Africa, at about 1 per 30 inhabitants, is 
extremely high in relation to other countries at a comparative stage in their 
economic growth’  (Ministry of Public Service and Administration, 1995:pages 
unnumbered). Consequently, ‘the greater part of the national consumption budget 
was devoted to the salaries, wages and benefits of public servants’  (Ministry of 
Public Service and Adminstration, 1995: pages unnumbered).  
 
Rightsizing was therefore an expression of government’s commitment ‘to reducing 
public expenditure as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and in 
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expenditure’ (Ministry of Public Service and Administration, 1995: pages 
unnumbered). Along with the integration of South Africa’s eleven former 
administrations, the TBVC3 ‘states’ and ‘self-governing’ territories into a unified 
public service, rightsizing was also a short-term outcome of government’s longer-
term goal of ‘creating a leaner and more cost-effective public service’  (Ministry of 
Public Service and Administration, 1995: pages unnumbered). A smaller public 
service would in turn enable the state to compete with private sector salaries. Also 
worth noting is that rightsizing was not just endogeneusly induced, but  
 
Also encouraged by global trends towards rightsizing, privatisation and the 
achievement of greater competetiveness, quality, efficiency, and cost-
effectiveness in public service provision (Presidential Review Commission, 
1998:pages unnumbered). 
 
Rightsizing was not an uncontroversial process, though its main critique appeared 
to have less qualms with the substance than with the apparent lack of appropriate 
planning around its implementation. Even government would later admit that the 
rightsizing exercise had been ‘ad hoc, poorly coordinated and communicated, and 
ineffectively implemented’ (Presidential Review Commission, 1998:pages 
unnumbered). Zola Skweyiya, then minister of public service and administration, 
for instance acknowledged that rightsizing had  
 
Largely failed to meet its original objectives and [had instead] resulted in a 
number of unintended adverse consequences for service delivery, staff morale, 
and the transformation process more generally (Skweyiya, 1998:pages 
unnumbered). 
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While rightsizing was to entail downsizing in some departments and upsizing in 
others, the quest for a leaner more cost-effective public service meant that 
downsizing would predominate. In this sense rightsizing became a euphemism for 
downsizing. In terms of definition, rightsizing  
 
[C]onnotes a process where, as a result of structural review and the 
establishment of manning levels and skills requirement of an organization, the 
organization ensures staff deployment based on the right mix of skills in 
numbers that will engender professional efficiency.  The resulting staff 
nominal roll may increase or decrease  (Bureau of Public Service Reforms, 
2009:pages unnumbered) 
 
Downsizing on the other hand  
 
[R]efers to a process where, the number of employees in an organization is 
reduced to a desired point based on such considerations as cost-saving, space 
utilization, manpower efficiency etc.  It may not necessarily achieve 
rightsizing  (Bureau of Public Service Reforms, 2009:pages unnumbered). 
 
Between March 1995 and March 1998 a perceptible reduction in the size of the 
public service was recorded (Table 3), apparently following the introduction of 
‘voluntary severance packages, natural attrition, and the partial eradication of 
“ghosting”, which is the corrupt practice of padding the staff with fictitious 
employees’  (Schwella, 2001:379). However, with regard to Voluntary Severance 
Packages and “ghosting” respectively, the Provincial Review Report notes that the 
reduction was less than hoped for: 
The Voluntary Severance Package has not reduced the numbers sufficiently in 
the Public Service. It has led to many skilled and capable people leaving the 
Public Service. Prescripts and directives were not properly followed by 
departments and provinces in managing the voluntary severance … 
Throughout the country, whilst effort has been made to reduce the numbers of 
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payroll of some provinces. (Ministry of Public Service & Administration, 
1997:pages unnumbered). 
 
Table 3: Employment Trends: March 1995 - March 1998 
  
 Mar-95 Mar-96 Apr-97 Mar-98 
National 
departments 414,991 406,349 345,090 335,886 
Provinces 855,121 847,733 829,095 810,335 
Statutory bodies 5,532 5,532 5,552 4,982 
Total 1,275,644 1,259,614 1,179,737 1,151,203 
Change in numbers -16,030 -79,877 -28,534 
Percentage change -1.3 -6.3 -2.4 
Cumulative change since 1995 -95,907 -124,441 
Percentage change  -7.5 -9.8 
    
Source:  (Schwella, 2001) 
 
While the reduction was less than hoped for, it was argued that it at least enabled 
South Africa to avoid the post-liberation growth in the public service characteristic 
of many African countries  (Schwella, 2001). Government’s own research would 
later confirm this trend, noting that ‘[o]verall the numbers of civil servants have 
been decreasing from 1.2 million in 1994 to just over 1 million in 2001’  (The 
Presidency, 2003:12). By 2002, the public service had shrunk by 15% since 1994, 
‘mostly as a result of attrition in low-level jobs, particulary in forestry and 
construction’  (PSC, 2002:20).  
 
Considering that downzising was not meant primarily to reduce the number of 
government employees but to generate budgets savings from a reduced wagebill, 
even the achieved reduction might have been a pyrrhic victory given the exorbitant 
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than not that those personnel whom the public service would have liked to retain 
requested to be retrenched, whilst others who could not be gainfully utilised did not 
apply for Voluntary Severance Package System (VSP)  (Fifield, 1998). The fact that 
many skilled and well-trained staff took severance packages also meant that the 
public service was left with untrained officials who were not exposed to such things 
as handling complex contracts. The outflow of well-skilled and competent staff 
created a vacuum, which enhanced the potential grounds for corruption, the 
misappropriation of public funds and the poor monitoring of public contracts  
(Fourie, 1998).  
 
Recent data also indicates that employment trends actually increased in number, 
that is from 2001 onwards. In Towards a Fifteen Year Review  the Presidency 
(2008:14) finds that  
Public-service employment declined from 1,2 million in 1994 to about one 
million in 2001, during the period of rationalization and integration, but 
increased again from around 2002. By 2007, it had increased to about 1,1 
million. 
 
Table 4 below captures this trend. 
 
Table 4: Public service employment trends: Sep 95 - March 08 
Race  Race Grand total Date 
white black   
Sep-95 312,772 954,994 1,267,766 
Sep-95 % 24.7 75.3   
Dec-01 158,225 873,369 1,031,594 
Dec-01 % 15.3 84.7   
Mar-08 131,703 1,072,822 1,204,525 
Mar-08 % 10.9 89.1   
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Cameron and Milne argue that this subsequent increase in the number of public 
servants (by about 170,000) – which is however still a bit less than the original size 
of the public service in 1995 – ‘coincided with a partial retreat from New Public 
Management and a move towards strengthening the core apparatus of a 
government of what was now a development state’ (p.13). This is consistent with 
NPM decline thesis espoused in this study’s introductory chapter. As the increase 
has largely been in the areas of Health and Safety and Security it also reflects on 
government’s concerted effort to grow the public services in these areas  (Ministry 
of Public Service and Administration, 2007). 
 
3.4. Devolution of managerial responsibility 
 
NPM thought, among other things, purports to increase the accountability of 
administration while improving its efficiency – the two issues most reforms in 
developing countries actually focus on (Morgan, 1996). Efficiency is thought to 
result from, among other things, giving more authority to public sector managers 
over operations including budgeting, purchasing and personnel  (Therkildsen, 
2001). This is based on the ‘notion that public sector managers are hampered by 
rules and regulations and have few if any incentives to take risks and to be 
innovative and service oriented’  (Therkildsen, 2001).  
 
The ‘unleashing’ of public sector managers is also believed to enhance 
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Transparency, translated into clear and explicit managerial targets combined 
with increased managerial autonomy and incentives to perform makes it 
easier to establish the basis for managerial accountability and to achieve 
outputs …  (Therkildsen, 2001:27). 
 
Managerial accountability, the argument goes, leads to political accountability as it 
enables politicians to monitor the extent to which targets are met and thus hold 
managers accountable for their performance or lack thereof  (Therkildsen, 2001). 
Increased political and managerial accountability in turn entails decreasing dangers 
of corruptive practices, which impacts positively on ‘efficiency’ - if it can be 
demonstrated that political and administrative corruption proves ‘inefficient’ by 
distracting from the ‘cost-efficient operations of government’  (DeLeon & Green, 
2000: pages unnumbered).  
 
The relaxing of rules, decentralisation of authority and increasing the discretion of 
public sector managers – also known as deregulation – is thus among NPM’s 
recommended courses of action  (Kaboolian, 1998). As already hinted, central to 
this move is the idea that, 
‘line management must be free to exercise authority over resources and 
personnel in pursuit of their mission … [and] not be centrally regulated by 
functional authorities with mandates to impose rules and directives with 
respect to financial management and personnel management’  (Aucoin, 
1990:123). 
 
The devolution of managerial responsibility in the South African public service is 
inscribed in the White Paper on the Transformation of Public Service Delivery 
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• Assignment to individual managers of responsibility of delivering specific 
results for a specified level of resources and for obtaining value for money in 
the use of those resources; 
• Individual responsibility for results matched by with managerial authority for 
decisions about how resources should be used; 
• Delegation of managerial responsibility and authority to the lowest possible 
level; and 
• Transparency about the results achieved and resources consummed 
 
Deregulation was also more pronounced in matters relating to the budget, financial 
management, and human resources. Details of the latter are set out in the 
Department of Public Service and Administration’s White Paper on Human 
Resources Management in the Public Service (1977). Necessitating this policy shift 
was the need to replace the  
 
[E]xcessive centralism of the [then] currrent system of public administration 
with an approach that permits maximum department autonomy and 
managerial responsibility within a coherent public service [as well as create] a 
systematic approach to accountability in which indicators are developed for 
measuring, monitoring and evaluating the quality of peformance of institutions 
and employees (Presidential Review Commission, 1998:pages unnumbered). 
 
Technical efficiency, that is, achieving maximum outputs at the lowest possible 
cost, was also an important consideration in this shift, the purpose being to afford 
managers the power to make decisions about allocating financial resources, hiring 
and firing of employees, as well as decisions relating to procurement issues. The 
logic here ‘rests on the assumption that line managers are best positioned to secure 
efficiency, economy and effectiveness in public management and that, freed from 
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It was further argued that centralised financial control in the previous dispensation 
appeared to have ‘absolved departmental managers from accountability for 
performance’  (Presidential Review Commission, 1998:pages unnumbered). 
Maserumulue (2007) argues that the Constitution of 1996, which came into effect 
on 4 February 1997,  legitimated the managerial approach to public adminstration:  
 
The Constitution of 1996 legitimated the evolving political consensus on the 
new model for state administration embedded in the imperatives of 
managerial approach to public administration. In order to give effect to the 
Constitution of 1996 regarding legitimating of the new model for state 
administration, Public Service Laws Amendment Act 47 of 1997 was 
promulgated  (Maserumule, 2007:159). 
 
To provide the necessary incentive for managers, and Head of Departments in 
particular, to exercise the managerial responsibility effectively and accountably, a 
move towards performance-related contracts was thought to be pivotal. In this 
regard public service regulations went into effect in early 1998 and form the basis 
for establishing performance contract between ministers and their chief executives  
(Therkildsen, 2001). A Performance Management and Development System for 
Senior Management Services members has been established. The PSC (PSC) drives 
the government’s system of performance management for Heads of Departments.  
 
This shift towards the empowerment of managers, or managerialism, has been 
criticised for stoking tensions between politicians and bureaucrats. Commenting on 
the political administrative interface at provincial level, the Provincial Review 
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Political interference hampers the administration of provincial departments 
throughout the country. There is a poor definition of the different roles of 
politicians and administrators  (Ministry of Public Service & Administration, 
1997: pages unnumbered). 
 
Chipkin (2002) by contrast points out that under managerialism bureaucrats are in 
effect less accountable to their political charges than to the National Treasury. 
Which ‘grants to the senior members of the bureacracy a high degree of autonomy 
vis-à-vis their ministers’  (Chipkin, 2002:7). Chipkin gives a historical sense of this 
dynamic: 
 
This is evident in the strained relationship between the Director General 
(Robinson Ramaite) and his minister (Geraldine-Fraser Moleketi). There are 
reports of officials failing to send memoranda intended for Cabinet timeously 
for such meetings. Hence Cabinet ministers are inadequately prepared to 
discuss their content. An interviewee of this paper went so far as to as to 
suggest that the new managerialism opens up the executive to a ‘coup-type 
situation’ (2002:7).  
 
Which explains why Fraser-Moleketi felt strongly about ‘resisting a situation where 
managerialism runs rampant with public managers showing impunity to those who 
have the legitimacy that democratic election bestows on them’  (Fraser-Moleketi, 
2003:pages unnumbered). The former minister was also critical of what she 
perceived as managerialism’s use of financial accountability as the sole 
consideration in determining managerial accountability: 
We are resisting a situation where financial accountability is the only 
accountability that managers assume or that financial accountability is 
embraced disproportionably to other considerations. Accountability goes 
much further and over a much broader terrain  (Fraser-Moleketi, 2003:pages 
unnumbered). 
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and Ramaite was not an isolated instance. There were number of other reported 
instances of conflict between Directors-General and Ministers, particularly during 
the first ten years of democratic rule, that is, 1994-2004  (Maserumule, 2007), 
which seemed to connote a crisis at the political administrative interface.  
 
The conflict-ridden relationships between former minister of Public Works, Jeff 
Radebe and his then Director-General, Van Robbroek; the case of the former 
director-general of the Department of Constitutional Development and Local 
Government Neil Barnard and the former minister of the same Department, Valli 
Moosa; and the case of former director-general of the Department of Home Affairs, 
Billy Masetla, and former minister of the same Department, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, 
are well documented. All these instances occured in the context of the shift to 
managerial autonomy. It could thus be speculated that these conflicts may have 
resulted from, 
 
[T]he introduction of the new model for state administration, which gave the 
directors-general more latitude and extensive power in the management of 
their departments, but in a policy vacuum, was mainly the cause of conflicts 
between them and their ministers during the period 1996–1998  (Maserumule, 
2007:160). 
 
Also commenting on the managerial approach the PSC has observed: 
Critics of this model argue that the political leadership rarely has the capacity 
to define, monitor and enforce targets, precisely. In these circumstance the 
managerial approach gives managers extraordinary discretion and corruption 
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Apparently corruption can also creep in when ‘inexperienced and not sufficiently 
trained … managers … ‘all of a sudden’ [had] to bear financial and managerial 
responsibility for public money in an environment of market competition, risk and 
uncertainty’  (von Maravic & Reichard, 2003:10). In its 2006 State of the Public 
Service Report, the PSC also finds that employees who had committed the highest 
number of financial misconduct transgressions are those who are usually placed in 
supervisory positions for the first time. Which speaks ‘to their lack of capacity to 
exercise the managerial responsibility placed upon them’  (PSC, 2006:22).  
 
This is perhaps why the Batho Pele White Paper stresses managerial ‘transparency 
about the results achieved and the resources consummed (1997: pages 
unnumbered).’ However the challenge of holding empowered managers 
accountable is among the issues that remain unresolved within the NPM discourse  
(Balogun, 2003). Paradoxically, the devolution of managerial responsibly was 
precisely to address the issue of managerial accountability for performance by 
objectives. As  Maserumule (2007:155) trenchantly notes: 
The managerial approach to public administration puts more emphasis on 
institutional outcomes rather than bureaucratic procedures and regulations. It 
accentuates decentralisation of responsibilities in the public service, 
delegation of authority, modernisation of the operations of government, and 
accountability for performance. 
 
The introduction of the managerial approach has thus elicited contradictory views. 
On the one hand is those analysists who think that it has made ministers more 
powerful by giving them power to fire and hire directors-general, thus encouraging 
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managerial discretion, which fosters corrupt practices and other general abuses of 
power. These apparently contradictory views on the effects of introducting the 
managerial approach in the public service are symptomatic and reflective of the 
conflicting prescipts of the Public Finance Management Act of 1999 on the one 
hand, which  
 
[P]uts more emphasis on the responsibility of managers, directors-general in 
particular, to manage innovatively with a view to improve public service 
delivery [and] actually makes a provision in its Chapter 10 for heavily 
punishing managers who abrogate their responsibilities to manage 
(Maserumule, 2007:161). 
 
The Public Service Regulations, which were also published and came to effect in 
1999, by contrast ‘empowered ministers to create and abolish posts, recruit, 
appoint, transfer, and discharge employees’  (Maserumule, 2007:161). This 
obviously includes directors-general. The PSC advances an identical argument: 
[T]he Public Service Regulations give powers to politicians to manage career 
incidents (human resource management) of public servants, whiltst the PMFA 
[Public Finance Management Act] assigns responsibility for financial 
management to heads of department’  (PSC, 2001:21). 
 
The effect of these two legislations was thus to equally empower a top public 
servant on the one hand, and a minister on the other, and as Maserumule 
(2007:161) once again observes: 
When two equally empowered influential figures in the administration of 
government departments have different sense of what need to be done, 
conflicts would naturally arise. 
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The intended effect of this reform is primarily the empowerment of citizens, which 
means regarding people as consumers and customers  (Therkildsen, 2001). This is 
shaped by the notion that ‘citizens are “clients,” mere recipients of public services 
who do not have to be actively engaged in the process of deciding what those 
services should be’  (Dunn & Miller, 2007:347). Defining citizens who interact with 
public sector organisations as consumers and customers is seen as progressive  
(Ehsan & Naz, 2003) and modern, and ‘[f]orms of tangible reward for being ‘in 
fashion’ are [known] to be commonplace’  (Pollitt, 2001:944). In South Africa, this 
view of citizens as customers is crystallised in the previously mentioned Batho Pele 
White Paper (1997), which  
[S]eeks to introduce a fresh approach to service delivery: an approach which 
puts pressure on systems, procedures, attitudes and behaviour within the 
Public Service and reorients them in the customer’s favour … and involves a 
framework for the delivery of public services which treats citizens more like 
customers … A framework which frees up the energy and commitment of 
public servants to introduce more customer-focused ways of working  
(Ministry of Public Service and Adminstration, 1997: pages unnumbered). 
 
The Batho Pele4 initiative draws heavily from the UK White Paper on Effeciency 
and Effectiveness, published in 1982, and in this sense it is part of the new public  
                                            
4 The Batho Pele initiative also espouses principles that are similar to its UK counterpart, namely: 
• Consultation: Citizens should be consulted about the level and quality of the public services 
they receive, and wherever possible, should be given choice about the services they are 
offered 
• Service standards: Citizens should be told what level and quality of public services they will 
receive so that they are aware of what to expect 
• Access: All citizens should have equal access to the services to which they are entitled 
• Courtesy: Citizens should be treated with courtesy and consideration 
• Information: Citizens should be given full, accurate information about the public services 
they are entitled to receive 
• Openness and transparency: Citizens should be told how national and provincial 
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management movement. 
 
As Fraser-Moleketi (2006:62) notes: 
 
There is a need to distinguish between the ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ dimensions of 
reform and acknowledge that NPM has influenced the ‘micro’ dimension 
notably on account of its focus on the three E’s, but also on the basis of the 
philosophy of ‘putting the citizens first’ which underpinned the movement in 
favour of ‘citizens charters’ in Britain in particular. 
 
Noting the apparent inappropriateness of the concept of the citizen as a ‘customer’ 
in the context of the public sector where, unlike in genuinely competitive markets, 
citizens cannot choose to take their business elsewhere in the event of their needs 
not being met, the Batho Pele White Paper goes on to argue that, 
 
Customer’ is nevertheless a useful term in the context of improving service 
delivery because it embraces certain principles which are as fundamental to 
public service delivery as they are to the provision of services for commercial 
gain … The term ‘customer’ will therefore be useful in taking forward the 
Batho Pele initiative (1997: pages unnumbered). 
 
The import therefore is that the use of the term should not raise undue concern. 
Some commentators however have called for closer scrutiny of the idea of public 
service customer service. Fountain (2001:56) entreats: 
The growing replacement of the term “citizen” with “customer” and the idea 
that government government agencies should be “customer-focused” – that is, 
that public managers should view their clients as customers and serve them 
using management concepts drawn from effective private sector firms – 
demands close scrutiny. 
 
                                            
• Redress: If the promised standard of service is not received, citizens should be offered an 
apology, a full explanation and a speedy and effective remedy; and when complaints are 
made, citizens should receive a sympathetic, positive response 
• Value for money: Public services should be provided economically and efficiently in order 
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While acknowledging that enhanced customer service may improve some aspects 
of service production and delivery, Fountain (2001) identifies some key challenges 
related to the customer concept in the context of the public service. The first is the 
problem of the identity of the customer in the public sector, and the second is the 
impossibility of defining meaningfully the upper bounds of effective customer 
service in the absence of prices. The first problem is well-known and even the 
Batho Pele White Paper notes that identifying the customer ‘is not as straightforward 
as it may appear’   (1997: pages unnumbered). 
 
Fountain’s arguments are primarily a response to the American National 
Performance Review, or Gore’s Report, as it is sometimes called. This Report was 
‘the foundation of federal government reform and modernisation during the Clinton 
administration’  (Fountain, 2001:71).  However it may be relevant to the Batho Pele 
initiative since there are some striking similarities between the two reform efforts. 
For instance both policy documents mandate agencies and departments to identify 
their customers, survey them on a regular basis to develop standards and measures 
of performance, benchmark their performance, and develop customer service 
standards.  
 
There are a number of reported weaknessess in putting the Batho Pele principles to 
practice, including poor senior management involvement in the monitoring of 
implementation, and lack of public involvement in the enforcement of the 
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assumed the existence of a ‘confident citizenry that holds officials to account 
without fear of reprisals …’  (The Presidency, 2003:13). The results of a qualitative 
survey, encapsulated below, into the subject feelings of Public Servants towards the 
Batho Pele policy and its implementation are also instructive. The survey sample 
was drawn from the Departments of Health and Social Development. The findings 
were as follows:  
 
• All respondents knew of the policy but had a reasonable to poor knowledge 
of its content and purpose, especially for those at a middle manager level. 
This is despite the fact that very few of them have been on any sort of an 
information workshop to brief them 
• Where the policy had been communicated, the mediums used were through 
workshops and posters/pamphlets. Communication seems to have been 
done as a once-off exercise and was poorest at middle manager level. 
Managers do not seem to have participated in communicating Batho Pele to 
external stakeholders 
• No respondents had taken place in a cultural change project relating to 
Batho Pele or knew of one. This corroborates anectodal evidence and the 
findings of the PSC compliance audit 
• Little attention is being paid to improving internal customer service or re-
engineering internal services. Despite apparent commitment to the Batho 
Pele principles at the highest level, there is little being done to address 
internal obstacles to improved service. In particular, a number of 
respondents cited (a) The prolonged time it takes to fill posts. Delays of six 
months seem to be common place, which puts increased pressure to bear on 
the remaining incumbents (b) The financial control system is better suited to 
control expenditure rather than to ‘invest’ funds to improve delivery systems 
• There are a few incentives to improve service delivery. It is expected that the 
performance management system may remedy this for senior managers, but 
it is not known when this will filter down to more junior managers  
• The majority of respondents feel that they are not given recognition or 
acknowledgement for service delivery improvement efforts. Furthemore, a 
number feel that they are not part of planning improvement efforts. These 
feelings are indicative of a high level of vertical solitude and can be 
expected to have a negative effect on worker motivation. Surveys on the 
determinants of employee motivation should be included in future efforts to 
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• Supervisors of middle managers encourage their subordinates primarily 
through the setting of standards 
• Generally the factors that prevent middle managers from implementing the 
Batho Pele policy are lack of resources, lack of communication and heavy 
workloads (Mokgoro, 2003:11-12) 
 
These findings are consistent with the findings of the PSC’s 2002 survey, which 
sought to establish the extent to which government departments were Batho Pele 
compliant. The Survey drew the following conclusions:  
 
• The public service was lacking in skills necessary for the application of 
Batho Pele principles; 
• The service delivery transformation programme was seen as separate from 
the day-to-day business of departments; 
• Demands for improved, as well as well as new services were imposed on 
service delivery units without the consideration of cost implications; 
• Batho Pele was a mere list of principles, without any indication of 
implementation; 
• The Batho Pele policy had not impacted on the daily tasks of front-line 
personnel; 
• “Batho Pele” had not been integrated with performance management 
strategic plans  (Mokgoro, 2003:12)  
 
These conclusions were not so much different from those derived from the PSC’s 
first comprehensive survey of the Batho Pele initiative, undertaken in June 2000. Six 
national departments and five provincial departments were surveyed from a total of 
130 departments (national and provincial combined). Conclusions of the survery 
were as follows: 
 
• Not enough is being done to consult public service customers about their 
needs. School governing bodies and community policing forums are most 
advanced but these remain fragile and in need of support. 
• All departments should establish and use proper formal consultative bodies 
and resource them as necessary. 
• Service standards are generally not displayed and users of services are not 
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• Basic service standards must be displayed in all public areas of public 
services buildings.  
• There is not equal access to public services with a wide range of local and 
regional variations in terms of quality and coverage 
• Every department must make a clear commitment to improve access to 
services particularly those that are seen as human rights, complete with 
improvement targets and resources where necessary. 
• Ensuring courtesy is one of the basic and achievable principle, yet is very 
important to public service customers. Departments must regularly 
undertake customer satisfaction surveys as part of an integrated monitoring 
and evaluation strategy. Such surveys should place strong emphasis on 
courtesy. 
• There is a clear link between consulation and information principles 
• Basic efforts have been made to provide information, though more needs to 
be done to move beyond mere contact lists.  
• Departmental Annual Reports should follow a prescribed format that should 
provide consistent comparable data. This format has been prescribed by the 
PSC in its recently released report on Government Annual Reports. 
• Limited efforts have been made to provide complaint handling facilities. 
• Very few departments undertake meaningful analysis of their performance. 
• There is a clear need to undertake close examination of the possibilities of 
providing services in new ways (alternative service delivery options (PSC, 
2002) 
 
As a former Minister of Public Service and Administration, Fraser-Moleketi’s 
(2006:70) observation is also instructive: 
 
In spite of the intent of the policy and notwithstanding its official launch in 
1997 the policy struggled to be fully integrated into the mainstream of public 
sector reform. It was initially treated as separate of, and in addition to, the 
core change management efforts and transformation of the public service 
machinery, in parts of the South African administrative system. The Batho Pele 
programme was not equally embraced and internalised by government 
departments across the national and provincial departments and hence the 
need for the repeated “revitalisation of [the] Batho Pele Strategy” or re-
thinking the implementation of this policy, e.g. 2001 and 2004. In parts of the 
administrative system, it was treated as an ‘add on’ to the core programmes of 
government departments rather than the catalyst ensuring the implementation 
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Nothing captures better the generally lacklustre approach of the public service 
workforce towards the Batho Pele initiative.  
 
3.6. Alternative Service Delivery (ASD) 
 
Governments externalise public services for a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
contrator may be able to provide a similar or higher quality service at a lower cost 
than government. Secondly, the contractor have skills, capacity or resources not 
available to the government. Thirdly, the service to be externalised may not be a 
core competency of government. And finally, a specific government department 
may wish to contract out a service in order to focus its efforts on other specific 
priorities  (Fourie, 1998). Defined as ‘a creative and dynamic process of public 
sector restructuring that improves the delivery of services to clients by sharing 
governance functions with individuals, community groups and other government 
entities’  (Ford & Zussman, 1997:6), alternative service delivery (ASD) is part of the 
NPM drive to increase service delivery efficiency, quality and/or extent of the 
services delivered. ASD is a uniquely Canadian term that has gained ascendancy as 
a worldwide phenomenon  (Wilkins, undated). It has been argued that: 
The contemporary state, especially in Africa, simply does not have access to 
the financial and human resources to provide the services demanded to 
improve the living conditions of the poor and the indigent. Therefore, 
governments are compelled to cooperate with business or the private sector to 
assist in the provision of services  (Thornhill, undated: pages unnumbered). 
 
The underlying rationale, once again, is that the public sector does not have the 
human or financial resources to do what is required, because ‘governments, by 
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resulting in inefficient, costly, and often poor quality services (Fourie, 1998:237). 
The corrective to this percieved problem is thought to be the  private sector, which 
presumably  
[G]enerates efficiency gains through cost reductions and improvements in the 
delivery of services as a result of advantages over the public sector in such 
areas as specialised and functional expertise, productivity of resources, 
flexibility, responsiveness, and access to new technology and innovations’  
(Fourie, 1998:237)      
 
The enormity and complexity of the challenge facing public service in South Africa  
(PSC, 2002) provided compelling motivation for government to consider alternative 
forms of service delivery. As will be seen later, the assumption that the public sector 
can benefit from private sector capacity is apparently not always justified (Freysen, 
1998). Discussed alternative service delivery mechanisms are privatisation, 




‘Privatisation’ is a multi-faceted term. It can be associated with a transfer from 
public to private ownership (sale of public enterprises, sale of assets or shares) or it 
can refer to all measures that tend to reinforce the role of the private sector 
(deregulation, liberalisation, restructuring, management contracts, leasing contracts) 
in the operation of enterprises  (Déme, 1997). In either case privatisation essentially 
entails ‘directing the allocation of government goods and services to outside firms’  
(Ehsan & Naz, 2003:38). In other words, a public service or facility is transferred to 
the private sector, usually with ownership, for it to be managed in accordance with 
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argues for a broader understanding of privatisation to include ‘not only the open 
sale of state assets, but also other processes that turn state functions over to the 
private sector and the market’ i.e. 
• The sale or partial sale of state-owned assets and enterprises. 
• The introduction of private competitors in sectors historically controlled by 
the state. This approach is argued to be effectively privatising part of an 
industry sectors, even if the state does not sell any assets - thus subjecting 
state interests to pressure to compete on the market, ultimately reducing their 
capacity to meet social needs. 
• Relinquishing the management of state functions to private interests, such as 
outsourcing services from the public service. It also takes the form of 
contracting management of municipal services to private companies. In 
these cases the state does not necessarily sell assets, but they nonetheless fall 
under private control. 
• The requirement that state functions operate on a commercial basis, in some 
cases registered under the Companies Act  (COSATU, 2001: pages 
unnumbered). 
 
In 1987, the White Paper on Privatisation and Restructuring spelled out the South 
African government’s position on the issue  (Jerome, 2004). Even before 1987 
privatisation was widely experimented with, as exemplified in the privatisation of 
Sasol in 1979. The democratic government however has, in most cases, pursued 
partial privatisation and commercialisation, as pressure from trade unions rendered 
full privatisation untenable. This had very much to do with the fact that ‘the 
position of the ANC has been anti-privatisation deriving from the Freedom Charter’  
(Jerome, 2004:7). Secondly, international sanctions made many multinational 
companies reluctant to buy South African companies  (Jerome, 2004). As a result 
privatisation in South Africa has been arguably slow ‘with few visible results and a 
general feeling among observers and donors that government’s commitment to the 
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The South African form of privatisation involved the ‘restructuring’ of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) in key economic sectors such as telecommunications, energy, 
defence and transport. Thus priority was given to the restructuring of Telkom, 
Eskom, Denel and Transnet respectively. Of the over 300 state-owned enterprises, 
which the post-apartheid government inherited, these four SOEs control 90 percent 
of the assets of the top 30 South African SOEs; provide 86 percent of the turnover 
and 94 percent of the net income earned by these top SOEs; and dominate the key 
strategic sectors of the economy with the potential to boost or undermine overall 
industrial economic policy and economic progress  (Fourie, 2001). 
 
 Cited reasons for SOE restructuring include, 
 
 … improving the access of the historically disadvantaged to services such as 
telecommunications, and electricity, increasing efficiencies, and hence 
reducing costs; and using the revenues earned through the disposal of state 
assets to reduce public debt  (The Presidency, 2003:38). 
 
Fourie (2001:205) also notes that while the contribution of SOE’s to the 
development of the country has been significant, they have been ‘plagued by 
structural and operational problems, resulting in irregular and unequal patterns of 
development and an uneven delivery of services and infrastructure’. Fourie 
attributes these problems to traditional modes of operation and outdated 
management practices, which is perhaps why the restructuring began in earnest 
under the NPM dispensation – the idea being to sell off these underperforming 
assets to generate revenue, improve service delivery and reduce the managerial 
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SOE restructuring reportedly ‘led to the reduction in public debt by raising funds 
from the private sector, thereby reducing pressure on the fiscus and creating an 
environment for competition’  (The Presidency, 2003:38). Public debt was reduced 
by R24 billion; an entrepreneur class was created, some industries were opened to 
competition and share-ownership widened (The Presidency, 2003). However, even 
the Presidency would admit that these ‘benefits’ came at a great cost, namely 
increased unemployment through the resultant job shedding, and actually 
increasing the size and complexity of government through the introduction of a 
wide range of regulatory bodies particularly in the sectors where SOE’s had been 
restructured. There have particularly been no significant gains evident from the 
introduction of these regulatory bodies, as ‘they are generally weak in relation to 
the corporations they are regulating’  (The Presidency, 2003:39). 
 
Fourie (2001:213) on the other hand is more cautious about associating the 
restructuring of South African SOEs with improved performance. He argues: 
International experience is not conclusive about whether or not restructuring 
has a positive impact on performance since it is not always easy to distinguish 
between, and/or to isolate for meaningful assessment, the potentially most 




After privatisation and rightsizing, corporatisation – the conversion of the ‘civil 
service into freestanding agencies or enterprises, whether within the civil service or 
outside it altogether ‘ – has been the most common initiative, not just locally but 
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‘prescribed that public agencies should be split up in small policy oversight boards 
and larger performance-based managed organization for service delivery’ (Van 
Dooren, 2006:75). As an NPM-style reform, corporatisation often takes place ‘as a 
means to achieve greater efficiency, cost savings or quality service improvements’  
(Polidano, 1999:9). The case for corporatisation has also been put forward as 
follows: 
In the mid-1990’s, an international consensus in development has emerged: 
democratisation, public sector downsizing, and economic deregulation are 
desirable goals in themselves, but they also reduce the extensive corruption in 
monopolistic state agencies  (Riley, 1998:129). 
 
Corporatisation however is not always necessarily an evidence of NPM-style reform 
as ‘it can also take place simply for convenience, a way of freeing a particular 
public function from the constraints of civil service red tape’  (Polidano, 1999:9). In 
South Africa however this reform became prominent during the introduction of 
NPM-type reforms. During the initial stages of the reform process, 60 public entities 
were created, compared to 10 in the decade before, employing an extra 288 983 
people  (The Presidency, 2003). By 2004 there were 336 public entities  (Fraser-
Moleketi, 2004). Operational autonomy and the implementation of commercial 
principles and practices were among the reasons for the creation of public entities  
(The Presidency, 2003).  
 
As noted in the above section on privatisation, the proliferation of autonomous 
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little control and supervision over their financial and managerial matters. In this 
regard, Public Service and Administration minister Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi notes, 
 
The proliferation of these entities, all created under disparate legislation, need 
to be assessed and aligned so that these resources are better directed towards 
achievement of national priorities. Accordingly the accountability framework 
of PEs needs to reflect this aspect  (Fraser-Moleketi, 2004: unnumbered). 
 
Scholars who are in strong favour of corporatisation as a deterrent to corruption in 
monopolistic state agencies are also wary that ‘[e]conomic liberalisation can also 
create opportunities for corruption, through the sales of parastatals in dubious 
circumstances, and the creation of new, corrupt markets …’  (Riley, 1998:129). For 
Haque (2001:71) the move towards business-like agencies threatens the  
[T]raditional mode of accountability based on a public scrutiny of public 
service activities through parliamentary debates, legislative committees, 
administrative tribunals and other democratic means. 
 
3.6.3. Public-private partnerships (PPP) 
 
PPP’s in public administration and management have long been around, and have 
not only been a feature of NPM but also other public management systems. This 
section however looks at PPP’s primarily from the NPM perspective, which means 
viewing the development of PPPs alongside the rise of the NPM. 
 
Kernaghan (2004:195) notes that:  
 
[I]t was not until the late 1980’s that scholars paid serious attention to 
defining, classifying, and analysing the rapidly growing number of 
partnerships among public, private and not-for-profit organisations. 
 
This is incidentally the same time that NPM gained favour in many Anglo-Saxon 
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politically contentious aspects of full privatisation’  (Farlam, 2005:1). While PPP’s 
are generally defined as a ‘partnership between the public sector and the private 
sector for the purpose of delivering a project or a service traditionally provided by 
the public sector’  (European Commission, 2003:16), in South Africa they are 
understood as: 
A contract between a public sector institution and a private party, in which 
the private party assumes substantial financial, technical and operational in 
the design, financing, building and operation of a project  (National Treasury, 
undated: pages unnumbered). 
 
This is definition however describes a specific PPP configuration and, unlike the 
European Commission’s definition, is not a general definition that accomodates all 
possible PPP relationships – from minimal to maximal private sector involvement. 
There are usually three approaches to outsourcing public sector functions to the 
private sector. Firstly, there are service contracts where private sector companies 
are contracted, on a competitive basis and usually for relatively shorter periods of 
time, for the completion of specific tasks. In this approach the public sector gets to 
benefit from the techical expertise of the private sector, while strictly shouldering 
the management of service contracts and investment responsibilities  (European 
Commission, 2003).  
 
The second approach is management and operation contracts where the 
responsibility for asset and operation management is transferred from the public to 
the private sector. Unlike service contracts, these often extend for longer periods 
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the public sector also maintains responsibility for investment decisions. The final 
approach to outsourcing public sector functions to the private sector is through 
leasing, which provides ‘a means for private firms to purchase the income streams 
generated by publicly owned assets in exchange for a fixed lease payment and the 
obligation to operate and maintain the assets’  (European Commission, 2003:21).  
 
The National Treasury’s foregoing definition of a PPP is much closer to describing 
the leasing approach, where the commercial risk is transferred to the private sector, 
‘as the lessor’s ability to derive a profit is linked with its ability to reduce operating 
costs, while still meeting designated service levels’  (European Commission, 
2003:21). Like under the service contract and operation and management contracts 
approaches, ‘the  responsibility for capital improvements and  network expansion 
remains with the public sector owner’ even though ‘in certain cases the lessor may 
be responsible for specified types of repairs and rehabilitation’  (European 
Commission, 2003:21). Lease agreements usually extend for much longer periods of 
time than service contracts or operation and management contracts.  
 
All three approaches ‘present opportunities for the private sector to participate in 
varying degrees in the maintenance, operation and management of infrastructure 
improvements’  (European Commission, 2003:19) while the public sector still 
maintains the overall financial responsibility. However there are other PPP 
approaches where the public sector relinquishes to the private sector much of the 
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partnerships such as the “build-operate-transfer” (BOT) system for instance the are 
more opportunities for the private sector to perform most of the functions 
traditionally undertaken by the private sector, though does not completely relieve 
public sector owners of the financing burden.  
 
However, types of PPP arrangements that involve private sector financing of 
projects that would otherwise have been financed by the public sector also exist. 
Examples include concessions – agreements that ‘enable a private investment 
partner to finance, construct, and operate a revenue generating infrastructure 
improvement in exchange for the right to collect the associated revenues for a 
specified period of time’; private divestiture, which ‘involves the sale of assets or 
shares of a state-owned entity to the private sector’  (European Commission, 
2003:24-25). This can either be a complete private divestiture where private 
investors acquire permanent ownership of a state utility with the state relinquishing 
all control, or partial private divestiture where ‘the government would retain 
ownership of a certain portion of the former public company’s assets’  (European 
Commission, 2003:25). 
 
There are several other ways in which a PPP arrangament can  be characterised 
including: 
 
• Sectoral basis – partnershisps with third sector organisations and civil society 
associations, with private business, with both business and the third sector; 
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• Economic basis – supply-side, demand-side or mixed demand/supply side 
partnerships; 
• Policy area – policy objectives of partnerships (e.g. promoting economic 
productivity, empowering clients and the disadvantaged, tackling social 
inclusion); and  
• Scope – vertical, horizontal and mixed partnerships  (Bovaird, 2004). 
 
In South Africa the tendency has been to see PPP’s more on a sectoral basis, in 
particular partnerships with the privates sector. This is no doubt influenced by the 
NPM understanding of PPPs as a means to introduce alleged private sector 
efficiencies into the public service and counter the failures of government-owned 
utilities. These failures have been linked to a number of factors, including  
 
[U]nder-pricing, low productivity, long queues and large portions of the 
population without access to basis services, lack of transparency, and 
damaging political interference in the operation of these … entities  (Jerome, 
2004:2). 
 
Among these private sector efficiencies is the idea competition, which in the NPM 
bible and based on traditional economic principles, provides the path to true 
enlightment in the sense that resource allocation is allegededly most ‘efficient’ 
when ‘arranged through markets in which potential suppliers compete with one 
another to cut costs and to attact customers by improving the quality of goods and 
services’  (Bovaird, 2004: 204). The supposed efficiency gains of PPP’s are among 
the sources of their criticisms.  
 
However a key reason for the introduction of PPPs in the public sector, according 
to  Bovaird (2004:203) is  
[S]ometimes to set up an organisation which will focus on a single issue or a 
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which bedevil many public sector agencies. [Which is somewhat paradoxical  
because] the desire to join up services across agencies to meet the holistic 
needs of clients may often drive in the opposite direction – making PPP’s, as 
well as their constituent public and private partners, more aware of and 
sensitive to the multiple objectives which all public bodies and actions might 
achieve. 
 
PPP’s have been particularly popular in South Africa, as exemplified in the fairly 
extensive PPP projects government has undertaken since the mid-1990’s particlarly 
those relating to the development and operation of public infrastructure. The South 
African government is proud to announce that its public service delivery record has 
been enriched through PPPs and that its ‘PPP project pipeline continues to grow, 
both in numbers and in the innovate value for money solutions it contains’  
(National Treasury, 2004:1). Government even set up a PPP unit within the 
National Treasury to oversee all PPPs at national and provincial government level, 
in line with the requirements of the Public Finance Management Act (PMFA) 1999  
(Farlam, 2005). 
 
Due to the usually complex nature of services undertaken with the PPP 
arrangement, there is greater latitude for manipulations by local and foreign firms or 
government officials  (Farlam, 2005). Löffler (1999 in Bovaird, 2004) also suggests 
fragmentation of structures and processes, which in turn lead blurring of 
responsibilities and accountability, as a major problem associated with a 
partnership approach to public issues. Thus corruption can easily flourish with 
minimal detection. The Maputo Development Corridor for instance saw South 
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of FirstRand following an enquiry into allegations that he accepted gifts and 
payments of more than R500 000 from the now convicted ANC former fundraiser, 
Schabir Schaik, whose company was part of the winning N3 toll road consortium  
(West, 2003).  
 
Some scholars have further argued that PPPs are often in favor of vested business 
interests rather than general public concerns, leading to the conclusion that ‘public 
governance has become more accountable and responsive to the affluent business 
community rather than to common citizens’  (Haque, 2000:605). Even under the 
traditional administration paradigm PPP’s were vilified for diluting political control 
over decision-making  (Bovaird, 2004).  
 
PPP arrangements such as  complete private divestitures, discussed earlier, can also 
be particularly sensitive (ideologically, legally, and constitutionally) especially 
when assets of national importance are involved  (European Commission, 2003). 
The private sector’s motivation for profit and the public sector’s concern with 
efficiency improvement also introduce ‘conflicts of interests with beneficiary 
governments which are committed to promoting equity and maximizing the well 
being of their citizens’  (European Commission, 2003:31).  
 
Seemingly cognisant of these PPP challenges, the South African government has, 
instead of abandoning this mode of service delivery, invested extensively in 
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PPPs. As will be discussed in the next chapter on the potentials of some NPM-
inspired ideas, ‘public benefit from PPP’s will depend to a large degree on effective 
management and monitoring systems’  (European Commission, 2003:13) 
 
3.7. Chapter Summary 
 
NPM in South Africa emerged against the backdrop of the administrative and 
political demise of apartheid in the early 1990s, as well as a growing emphasis on 
NPM-type reforms in the rest of the Commonwealth during the same period. In 
South Africa, as in most other countries, the emphasis of these reforms was on 
legislative, policy and other guidelines aimed at quality and professional service 
delivery as well as increased accountability. The Presidential Review Commission 
was a key actor in the birth and adoption of the NPM framework in South Africa.  
 
Rightsizing, the strengthening of managerial responsibility, the redefinition of the 
citizen as a ‘customer’ and alternative service delivery methods were among the 
key NPM-inspired reforms. Rightsizing failed to bring about the expected reductions 
in the size of the civil service. The concept of the autonomous manager is criticised 
for increasing bureaucratic discretion and therefore facilitating bureaucratic 
corruption, as well as creating tensions between managers and politicians.  
 
The Batho Pele policy framework, modelled after the UK White Paper on Efficiency 
and Effectiveness, embodied the redefinition of the citizen as a ‘customer’ concept. 
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citizens, including low income households, which may diminish public confidence 
in governance. The South African government, during both the apartheid era and 
afterwards, has also experimented and continues to experiment with alternative 
service delivery methods such as privatisation, corporatisation, and public private 
partnerships.  
 
Under the democratic dispensation full privatisation was not pursued due to 
pressure from trade unions. Commercialisation and restructuring of State Enterprises 
was a less threatening option, although this is also highly contested. Effects of this 
reform including increased unemployment due to job-shedding, as well as 
paradoxically expanding the state through the introduction of numerous regulatory 
bodies, which the restructuring necessitated. The latter effect was also experienced 
as a result of corporatisation.  
 
Various types of Public-Private Partnership arrangements also present options for 
alternative service delivery. Opportunties for corruption in PPPs are also thought to 
abound. There are also criticisms about PPPs being a conduit for the interests of 
affluent business rather than general public concerns. The next chapter explores 
some conclusions that may be drawn from South Africa’s experiences and 





















While a review of the literature indicates that NPM-type reforms are problematic 
and do fall far short of their promise, this should not automatically point to an 
intrinsic incompatibility of NPM with public service goals. Viewing NPM ‘as an 
evolving process, one whose theory and practice is open for amendment and 
improvement’  (DeLeon & Green, 2000: pages unnumbered), one must be open to 
the possibility that some NPM-related reforms may be usefully adapted to the South 
African public service context. To echo Larbi (1999:5),  
 
While the new public management may not be a panacea for the problems of 
the public sector … a careful and selective adaptation of some elements to 
selected sectors may be beneficial. 
 
NPM reform failures may be less related to the content of the reforms than to the 
possibility that the South African public service may still be a long way from 
adapting and putting useful NPM ideas into practice. This chapter thus explores the 
possibilities that the negative consequences associated with NPM, as seen in the 
previous chapters, may have less to do with the content of the reforms than with the 
failure to interpret them in a way that is appropriate to the South African context. It 
thus takes a second look at some of the NPM-inspired ideas discussed in the 










Dissertation with corrections_04_09_2009 86 
Batho Pele initiative, and alternative service delivery mechanisms, Public-Private 
Partnerships in particular.  
 
4.2. Devolution of Managerial Responsibility and the Batho Pele Initiative 
 
It is easy to conclude from the cases discussed in the previous chapter that NPM-
type reforms have failed and therefore not suitable for the South African public 
service. In fact a number of South African commentators do not entertain the 
possibility of successful NPM-type reform strategies. Mc Lennan (2007:3) for 
instance avers: ‘[t]he adoption of new public management techniques, strategies, 
and/or policies can undermine or weaken the state and negate any possibility of 
more effective delivery to the poor.’  
 
Which makes Mc Lennan appear susceptible to the proverbial tendency of throwing 
the baby away with the bath water – the very tendency she cautions against  (Mc 
Lennan, 2007). While not discounting the value of Mc Lennan’s observations, there 
is evidence to suggest that the little success experienced with the reforms discussed 
above, particularly the devolution of managerial responsibility and the Batho Pele 
initiative, has less to do with the fact that they were NPM-type reforms than the 
apparent failure to put them to practice. 
 
Mc Lennan herself for instance argues that ‘public managers were (and still are) 
constrained … They have very little say or control over staffing, budget priorities, 
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have been devolved, authority has not  (Mc Lennan, 2007). This is contrary to the 
spirit and letter of the Batho Pele White Paper, which, as noted earlier, stipulates,  
 
• Individual responsibility for results matched with managerial authority for 
decisions about how resources should be used [emphasis mine]; 
• Delegation of managerial responsibility and authority to the lowest possible 
level [emphasis mine]. 
 
Similarly there is evidence to suggest that putting into practice the Batho Pele 
initiative as embodied in the eight principles set out in the White Paper remains a 
big challenge, not only in the public service, but also in the public sector as a 
whole. Which seems to suggest that the problem may not so much be the Batho 
Pele policy framework than the absence of the fundamentals that would enable the 
policy to suceed. These fundamentals, according to Mokgoro (2003) include 
attidudes, beliefs, skills, structure, systems, and processes. Thus there is a need to 
strengthen and maintain the Batho Pele initiative, its NPM association 
notwithstanding.  
 
4.3. Public-Private Partnerships 
 
While a prescription readily promoted by international agencies, PPP’s in South 
Africa present an opportunity and some recognised advantages, including the 
ability to raise extra finance in the country’s environment of macro-economic 
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the ability of PPP’s  to harness additional financial resources from the private sector 
are partly the reason why they developed in the first place  (European Commission, 
2003). 
 
While not downplaying the concerns and criticisms of PPPs raised in the previous 
chapter, it would seem that the real question is not whether PPP’s are legitimate, 
but which types of PPP are appropriate for which tasks and how to manage PPP’s to 
increase public value  (Bovaird, 2004). The PPP-related problems raised in the 
previous chapter seemingly may have less to do with the PPP as a concept than the 
failure of the public sector to exercise fully its important role of ensuring that PPPs 
are well managed and regulated throughout their design, construction and 
operation stages, and that contracts are monitored effectively so that contractual 
obligations are met, both in terms of quantity and timing. As the European 
Commisssion (2003) notes, 
The effectiveness and impact of a PPP depends, to a large extend, on the 
regulatory mechanisms used to influence and guide the parties and in 
particular the private sector decision-making process … Experience has shown 
that early development of conducive and consistent national legislative and 
regulatory structures greatly facilitates the identification, development and 
implementation of PPPs (pp. 38-39).  
 
Similarly Argyriades, (2003), a staunch critic of NPM-type reforms, at least 
concedes:  
[P]ublic–private ‘partnerships’ have worth only on condition that ‘public’, in 
such cases, is represented by strong and virtuous states, fully equipped with 
legal frameworks and served by dedicated, competent and principled officers 
(pp. 524-525). 
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success of PPP’s is the existence of institutional structures, ‘which both facilitate 
PPP development and provides clear boundaries to protect the interests of all 
parties’  (European Commission, 2003:48). This is particularly important when the 
role and responsibilities of the public sector shift from direct service provision to 
management and monitoring  (European Commission, 2003). The complexity of 
exercising oversight in the awarding, implementation and operation of PPP’s like 
concession agreement has seen governments worldwide establishing ‘dedicated, 
stand-alone state agencies or special purpose vehicles (SPV) with the sole 
responsibility of overseeing PPP projects’  (European Commission, 2003:25). The 
National Treasury’s PPP Unit, which is modeled after the UK and Ireland’s 
centralized approach, is reflective of this trend.  
 
However, sustainable success of PPPs is not only contingent upon the creation of 
government-led structures, but also more importantly upon the inclusion of civil 
society in the monitoring and oversight structures. In South Africa opportunities for 
civil society inclusion in government processes are often very limited in general, as 
government tends to regard civil society organizations with suspicion and mistrust.  
There is a strong case for the integration of civil society and the general public in 
the monitoring process as they are ‘a critical barometer of performance and 
suitability of PPP implementation’  (European Commission, 2003:49).  
 
Lastly, any conclusions that may be drawn about PPPs must be mindful of the fact 
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(Bovaird, 2004:213-214) and for this reason due caution must be exercised in 
judging their future significance. Each type of PPP has its strengths and weakness 
depending on sectoral and project contexts. 
 
4.4.  Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter argued that failures associated with NPM-type reforms such as the 
principle of the autonomous manager, the Batho Pele initiative and the concept of 
Public-Private Partnerships may have less to do with the reforms themselves than a 
faulty interpretation of their content and failure to adapt it appropriately. For 
instance, while managerial responsibility has been devolved, authority has not. 
There is poor senior management involvement in monitoring the implementation of 
Batho Pele principles, as well as a lack of public involvement in the enforcement of 
the principles. While South Africa has the instititional structures, legal and 
regulatory conditions necessary for the success of Public-Partnerships, opportunities 
for civil society inclusion are often very limited in general. Integration of civil 
society and the general public in the monitoring process is a critical barometer of 
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5. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
 
This dissertation has attempted to provide an overview of the evolution of the NPM 
internationally, as well as its role in the transformation and reform of the South 
African public service following the transition to inclusive democracy in 1994. The 
research has demonstrated that internationally, NPM has registered mixed results. 
On the one hand it is vilified for lacking in substance, promoting the interests of the 
elite at the expense of operational staff and citizens, embracing private sector 
management techniques uncritically, loss of bureaucratic accountability, unethical 
conduct and corruption, and exacerbating the tension between public managers 
and elected public officials. On the other hand NPM is associated with inspiring 
some positive movements in the public sector, such as facilitating a move towards 
more hands on professional management, more explicit standards and measure of 
performance, greater emphasis on output rather than input control, shift to greater 
competition and contract-based delivery of services and greater parsimony in the 
use of public resources.  
 
The research has also demonstrated that while the significance of NPM in the 
reform and transformation of the South African public service has, since the start of 
the new millennium, shown signs of decline in favour of a strong central 
developmental state, it did find its way into the South African reform agenda and its 
continuities are still evident. This was discussed with reference to mutually related 










Dissertation with corrections_04_09_2009 92 
downsizing, the devolution of managerial responsibility or the concept of the 
autonomous manager, the redefinition of the citizen as a ‘customer’ or emphasis on 
customer service, and alternative service delivery methods such as Public-Private 
Partnerships. 
 
5.1. Rightsizing and downsizing 
 
Rightsizing effectively became euphemism for downsizing, as it was clear that the 
new government had to get rid of the supernumerary personnel resulting from the 
amalgamation of the various public services from the apartheid state. However by 
using the Voluntary Severance Package (VSP) as a rightsizing tool, government 
failed to achieve the intended goal and instead incurred a number of unintended 
adverse consequences for service delivery, staff morale, and the transformation 
process more generally. The shift to a strong central developmental state has seen 
less emphasis on downsizing  and thus an increase in the number of public service 
employees.  
 
5.2. Devolution of managerial responsibility 
 
The South African democratic government has experienced little success with 
attempts to give more authority to public sector managers over operations like 
budgeting, purchasing and personnel. This has elicited contradictory views. In 
addition to exacerbating tensions between managers and their political heads, the 
managerial approach has been vilified for giving managers extraordinary discretion, 
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thought to have made ministers more powerful by giving them power to fire and 
hire directors-general, thus encouraging political loyalty. This paradox is 
symptomatic and reflective of the conflicting prescipts of the Public Finance 
Management Act of 1999, which empowers managers, and the Public Service 
Regulations of the same year, which empower ministers.  
 
There is however evidence to suggest that the little success experienced with 
managerialism has less to do with the fact that it’s an NPM-type reforms than the 
apparent failure to put it to practice. Public managers are still constrained and have 
very little say or control over staffing, budget priorities, spending or poor 
performance. While responsibilities have been devolved on paper, authority has 
not. 
 
5.3. Greater emphasis on service 
 
Seeking to introduce a fresh approach to service delivery by putting pressure on 
systems, procedures, attitudes and behaviour within the Public Service through a 
framework that treats citizens more like customers, the Batho Pele initiative has not 
registered much success either. Putting the Batho Pele principles to practice 
remains a major challenge,  amplified by poor senior management involvement in 
the monitoring of Batho Pele implementation, and lack of public involvement in the 
enforcement of the Batho Pele principles. Which seems to suggest that the problem 
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the absence of the attidudes, beliefs, skills, structure, systems, and processes that 
would enable the policy to suceed.  
 
5.4. Alternative service delivery methods 
 
The South African democratic government has experimented extensively with 
externalising public services for the purposes of delivering higher quality services at 
relatively lower costs, harnessing skills, capacity and resources that are not 
available to the government, and focusing efforts on the other specific priorities. 
The discussed alternative service delivery methods were privatization, 
corporatization and Public-Private Partnerships. 
 
5.4.1. Privatization  
 
Pressure from trade unions rendered full privatisation in democratic South Africa 
untenable. Consequently government pursued partial privatisation and 
commercialisation, which was mainly in the form of ‘restructuring’ State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) in key economic sectors such as telecommunications, energy, 
defence and transport. The results of this restructuring have been mixed. On the 
one hand they have registered a reduction in public debt, created an entrepreneur 
class, opened some industries to competition and widened share-ownership.  
 
However, this was at a great cost, namely increased unemployment through the 
resultant job shedding, and actually increasing the size and complexity of 
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particularly in the sectors where SOE’s had been restructured. No significant gains 
are evident from the introduction of these regulatory bodies, as they are generally 




While not always an NPM-dictated development the conversion of the public 
service into freestanding agencies or enterprises, whether within the public service 
or outside it altogether, has been one of the most visible public service reform in 
post-apartheid South Africa. It however happened to gain prominence during the 
period when South Africa was experimented with different types of reforms, 
including the NPM. Corporatisation has also led further to the proliferation of 
autonomous agencies, which has presented immense regulatory challenges, with 
government having little control and supervision over their financial and 
managerial matters. It also presents corruption risks, namely through the sales of 
parastatals in dubious circumstances. 
 
5.4.3. Public-Private Partnerships 
 
Cognisant of the fact that PPP’s in public administration and management have long 
been around, and have not only been a feature of NPM but also other public 
management systems, this study looked at PPP’s primarily from the NPM 
perspective, which meant viewing the development of PPPs alongside the rise of 
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Seeing it as a more politically acceptable alternative to full privatisation, the South 
African government opted for PPP configurations where the public sector still 
maintained substantial control over contracts with the private sector. Due to the 
usually complex nature of services undertaken with the PPP arrangement, there is 
greater latitude for manipulations by local and foreign firms or government officials. 
The private sector’s motivation for profit and the public sector’s concern with 
efficiency improvement also introduce conflicts of interests with beneficiary 
governments which are committed to promoting equity and maximizing the well 
being of their citizens.  
 
Equally PPP’s present for South Africa an opportunity and some recognised 
advantages, including the ability to raise extra finance in the country’s environment 
of macro-economic constraints and budgetary restrictions. It would seem that the 
real question is not whether PPP’s are legitimate, but which types of PPP are 
appropriate for which tasks and how to manage PPP’s to increase public value.  
 
5.5. Lessons learned 
 
NPM-type reforms have largely failed to live up to expectations. While in some 
cases this is due to certain unresolved contradictions and weakness within some 
NPM-doctrines, failure can also result from other factors that have nothing to do 
with the essence of the NPM philosophy. This appears to be the case with South 
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autonomy, Batho Pele, and alternate service delivery seems less of a problem than 
inappropriate interpretation and insufficient commitment to ensure implementation 
and sustainability of reforms.  
 
5.6. Areas for future research 
 
In South Africa there is as yet no proper sense of the consequences relating to 
experimentation with NPM reforms and how this has affected the shift towards a 
strong, central developmental state. More in-depth investigation is needed in this 
regard, which is essential to understanding the potential threats posed by some of 
the notions underpinning the NPM paradigm to sustainable development and sound 
administration within the developmental state. Linked to this is the need for more 
systematic research, backed by empirical data, into the relationship between the 
intrinsic content of NPM reforms and how reformers interpret them. Otherwise it 
will remain difficult to establish conclusively whether the experience with reform 
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